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ARTICLES 
PRIVATE DISORDERING? 
PAYMENT CARD FRAUD LIABILITY RULES 
Adam J. Levitin* 
This Article argues that private ordering of fraud loss liability in 
payment card systems is likely to be socially inefficient because it does not 
reflect Coasean bargaining among payment card network participants. 
Instead, loss allocation rules are the result of the most powerful party in the 
system exercising its market power. Often loss liability is placed not on the 
least cost avoider of fraud, but on the most price inelastic party, even if that 
party has little or no ability to prevent or mitigate losses. Moreover, for 
virtually identical payment systems, there is international variation in both 
loss liability rules and security standards, suggesting that at least some 
variations are suboptimal. 
True Coasean bargaining is not possible in payment systems; the 
transaction costs are too high because of the sheer number of participants. 
Targeted coordination and competition, however, can achieve outcomes that 
if not Coasean, are at least optimized relative to the current system. Thus, 
the Article suggests a pair of complimentary regulatory responses. First, 
regulators should develop a system for coordinating payment card security 
measures with governance that adequately represents all parties involved in 
payment card networks. And second, regulators should pursue more 
vigorous antitrust enforcement of card networks’ restrictions on merchant 
pricing to expose the costs of participating in a payment system—which 
include fraud costs—to market discipline. The Article also presents an 
extended defense of the major existing regulatory intervention in payment 
card fraud loss allocation, the federal caps on consumer liability for 
unauthorized payment card transactions. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 2 
I. PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS AND LIABILITY RULES ............................................ 10 
A. Structure of Payment Card Networks ............................................................ 10 
B. Payment Card Liability Rules in the United States ........................................ 14 
II. WHAT HATH PRIVATE ORDERING WROUGHT? ................................................... 16 
                                                                                                                 
  * Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank 
William Bratton, Mark Budnitz, Robert Hunt, Sarah Levitin, and Ronald Mann for their comments 
and encouragement, and Steven Schwarzbach for research assistance. Comments? 
AJL53@law.georgetown.edu. 
2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
A. Who Is the Least Cost Avoider? Card-Present Transactions ......................... 16 
B. Who Is the Least Cost Avoider? Card-Not-Present Transactions .................. 20 
C. Making Sense of the Liability Rules ............................................................... 22 
D. International Variation in Liability Rules and Fraud Arbitrage ................... 24 
1. International Variation ............................................................................... 24 
2. Fraud Arbitrage ......................................................................................... 29 
III. REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS .......................................................................... 30 
A. The Coordination Problem in Payment Card Networks ................................ 30 
B. Encourage Better Governance for Security Standard Coordination ............. 32 
C. More Vigorous Payments Antitrust Policy..................................................... 36 
IV. LIMITATIONS OF CONSUMER LIABILITY: A DEFENSE ........................................ 38 
A. Consumer Liability Rules for Unauthorized Payment Card Transactions ..... 38 
B. The Case Against Mandatory Liability Rules ................................................ 39 
C. In Defense of the Consumer Liability Limitations ......................................... 40 
1. Counterfactual Consideration .................................................................... 40 
2. Monetary Deductibles, Copayments, and Contributory Negligence .......... 41 
3. Non-Pecuniary Costs .................................................................................. 42 
4. Limited Consumer Ability to Prevent Fraud............................................... 42 
5. Consumer Knowledge of Liability Rules and Concerns About Issuer 
Compliance ..................................................................................................... 43 
6. Adverse Selection as Justification for Mandatory Liability Rules .............. 44 
7. Contractual Frictions:  Information Asymmetries, Bargaining Costs, 
Bundled Pricing, Hyperbolic Discounting, and Price Salience ..................... 45 
8. Relative Ability to Bear Losses ................................................................... 46 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 47 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Payment card fraud is a multi-billion dollar problem domestically and 
globally. While there are no firm numbers on the actual cost of payment 
fraud, one recent study estimates total costs of credit and debit card fraud in 
the U.S. at approximately $109 billion in 2008.1 The losses from payment 
card fraud are borne directly by merchants, a range of financial institutions, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See LEXISNEXIS, 2009 LEXISNEXIS TRUE COSTS OF FRAUD STUDY 6, 50, 54 (2009), 
available at http://www.riskfinance.com/RFL/Merchant_Card_Fraud_files/LexisNexisTotalCost 
Fraud_09.pdf [hereinafter LEXISNEXIS FRAUD STUDY] (estimating total cost of all payment fraud 
in the U.S. at $191.30 billion and that credit and debit fraud account for 57% of the total). These 
figures should not be taken as precise statements because the study’s methodology was not always 
clear and the figures did not include the costs sunk into fraud prevention by financial institutions 
and merchants or the non-pecuniary costs of fraud, such as distortions in consumer purchasing and 
payment patterns or time and hassle for consumers to straighten out credit reports and accounts. 
See id. at 17. For a very different estimate of fraud costs, see Richard J. Sullivan, The Changing 
Nature of U.S. Card Payment Fraud: Industry and Public Policy Options, FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV., 2Q 2010, at 101, 112, available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/ 
Publicat/Econrev/pdf/10q2Sullivan.pdf (estimating $3.718 billion in credit and debit card fraud 
losses in 2006 in the US). See also Kate Fitzgerald, An Industry At A Loss, PAYMENTSSOURCE, 
May 2010, at 16, 17 (reporting bank card fraud expenses as $.95 billion for 2009 and $1.11 billion 
for 2008). 
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and consumers. Payment card fraud also creates deadweight loss for the 
entire economy by increasing the cost of payments, the ultimate transaction 
cost.2 Payment card fraud results in socialized losses because of the law 
enforcement resources spent combating the problem and may also frustrate 
some legitimate transactions that get caught by overly broad fraud 
prevention methods.3 
The allocation of these losses occurs through a combination of public 
law and private ordering. Federal law generally limits individual consumer 
liability for unauthorized credit and debit card transactions to $50.4 The 
liability of merchants and financial institutions as well as business 
cardholders5 is generally determined through private ordering.6   
The loss allocation rules are important not only because of their 
distributional consequences, but because of the incentives they create. The 
greater a party’s liability for fraud losses, the greater incentive the party will 
have to take care to avoid fraud. As payment card fraud has (apparently) 
increased,7 it is worth asking whether the current loss allocation system is 
the optimal one. Does it properly incentivize parties to take the optimal 
level of care from a social welfare standpoint? Does the loss allocation 
system facilitate or discourage commerce by limiting the transaction cost of 
payment? 
                                                                                                                 
 2. To the extent that merchants bear losses, payment fraud may get passed on to consumers in 
the form of higher sale prices. 
 3. DELL INC., SUBMISSION OF DELL, INC. TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE REGARDING SECTION 920 OF THE ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ACT (REDACTED 
VERSION) 4, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/dell_comment_letter_20101118.pdf 
[hereinafter DELL LETTER]. 
 4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1643(a), 1693g(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(1)(ii) (2010) (credit cards); 
id. § 205.6(b) (debit cards). If the consumer does not provide the card issuer with timely notice 
that the consumer’s card has been lost or stolen, the consumer’s liability can increase up to $500. 
Id. See infra part IV for a more detailed discussion of consumer liability rules. 
 5. See 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006) (exempting “extensions of credit primarily for business, 
commercial, or agricultural purposes, or to government or governmental agencies or 
instrumentalities, or to organizations” from the credit transaction provisions of the Truth in 
Lending Act); id. § 1693a (defining “account” for the purposes of the Electronic Fund Transfer 
Act as being “established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”). These 
exemptions would cover even sole proprietors if the credit was extended or the account 
established primarily for business purposes, as with a “business” card or “business” deposit 
account. 
 6. An exception is state laws relating to data security breach notification. See Paul M. 
Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 
924–25, 972–84 (2007). 
 7. LEXISNEXIS FRAUD STUDY, supra note 1, at 26–27. Given the lack of solid payment card 
fraud statistics in the United States, it is impossible to say with absolute certainty whether fraud 
levels are increasing, much less relative to the size of the market. While issuers report fraud 
losses, some of these losses are first-party fraud, where the consumer simply denies having carried 
out the transaction that he or she made, while others are third-party fraud. Jasbir Anand, First 
Party Fraud, SC MAGAZINE (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.scmagazineus.com/first-party-
fraud/article/108545. 
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There is a sizeable literature on fraud and mistake liability allocation 
rules in payments systems.8 This literature, however, generally focuses on 
public law and on the propriety of liability allocation to consumers. There 
has been little scholarly consideration of the private law that allocates 
liability between merchants and financial institutions.9 The reason for this 
comparative neglect is unclear. Until recently, payment card network 
operating rules were not publicly available, which limited a critical primary 
source for scholars. Moreover, scholars may have considered the allocation 
of liability between merchants and financial institutions less of a policy 
concern because the asymmetries in terms of information, sophistication, 
and ability to exercise rights are less acute between merchants and financial 
institutions than they are between consumers and financial institutions. 
In perhaps the most extensive exposition on the issue, Professor 
Richard Epstein and attorney Thomas Brown argue that the current system 
of private loss allocation layered on top of a statutory baseline is flawed.10 
Epstein and Brown argue that losses should be allocated solely through 
private ordering. In their view, which they “would have thought beyond 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See Mark E. Budnitz, Commentary: Technology as the Driver of Payment System Rules: 
Will Consumers Be Provided Seatbelts and Air Bags?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (2008); Robert 
D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 63, 71–72 n.42 (1987) (reviewing pre-1970s writings on this topic); Francis J. Facciolo, 
Unauthorized Payment Transactions and Who Should Bear the Losses, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605 
(2008); Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 181 (1996); Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Uniformity and Diversity in Payment 
Systems, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 499 (2008); Gail Hillebrand, Before the Grand Rethinking: Five 
Things To Do Today with Payments Law and Ten Principles to Guide New Payments Products 
and New Payments Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 769 (2008); Sarah Jane Hughes, Duty Issues in the 
Ever-Changing World of Payments Processing: Is It Time for New Rules?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
721 (2008); Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2002) [hereinafter Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards]; Ronald J. Mann, 
Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age, 93 GEO. L.J. 633 (2005) [hereinafter 
Mann, Making Sense of Payments]; James Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle of Loss Allocation 
for Unauthorized Checks, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453 (2004); Linda J. Rusch, Reimagining 
Payment Systems: Allocation of Risk for Unauthorized Payment Inception, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
561 (2008). 
 9. I have identified only two works that focus on this issue in any detail. See Duncan B. 
Douglass, An Examination of the Fraud Liability Shift in Consumer Card-Based Payment 
Systems, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI. ECON. PERSP., 1Q 2009, at 43; Richard A. Epstein & Thomas P. 
Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (2008). Some other 
works touch on payment card fraud liability rules, but do not consider them in detail, as they focus 
on other types of payment systems. See Robert G. Ballen & Thomas A. Fox, The Role of Private 
Sector Payment Rules and a Proposed Approach for Evaluating Future Changes to Payments 
Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937 (2008) (focusing on payment transaction rules among financial 
institutions); Facciolo, supra note 8 (including a review of checks, ACH debits and wire transfers 
along with credit and debit cards); Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards, supra note 8; Rusch, 
supra note 8 (focusing on risk-allocation in unauthorized debits from deposit accounts). 
 10. Epstein & Brown, supra note 9, at 209. Epstein and Brown approach payment systems 
with a very strong set of anti-regulatory priors, or, as they refer to it, as their “classical liberal 
perspective.” Id. at 203. Brown, an antitrust attorney, has previously worked in-house for Visa. Id. 
at n. ††. 
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reproach . . . voluntary contracts offer by far the best way to allocate the 
risks of loss, and the duties of prevention, among the various parties within 
this elaborate network.”11 Thus, Epstein and Brown “see no reason even for 
th[e] (modest) restriction on freedom of contract [created by the federal 
limitation on consumer liability for unauthorized transactions]. If payment 
card companies think larger penalties are appropriate and disclose such 
penalties to consumers, the losses should not be socialized as a matter of 
law.”12 For Epstein and Brown, all liability for unauthorized transactions 
should be allocated contractually; mandatory (or even default) statutory 
rules are inappropriate in their view.13 
This Article argues that we should be skeptical of the efficiency of 
private ordering in payment card markets. In a world with a complete set of 
perfectly competitive markets, private ordering is surely the right 
outcome—Coasean bargaining would ensure that fraud losses would be 
allocated to the least cost avoider and the optimal level of care would ensue. 
But there is never a complete set of perfectly competitive markets except in 
economists’ models and dogmatic fantasies,14 and Coase’s great lesson is 
that transaction costs matter; in their presence, the initial allocation of 
liability is critical.15 
Payment card markets are always incomplete, as there are no futures or 
insurance markets in most areas of payments through which risks can be 
hedged.16 If one commits to using a payment system, thereby incurring 
fraud risk, one cannot also short payment fraud futures as a hedge, much 
less the futures on a particular card or transaction. At best, one could short a 
payment card network, but that is an imperfect proxy for fraud risk, as the 
costs to a network from elevated fraud are limited, and is hardly negatively 
correlated with fraudulent activity on a particular card-linked account.17 
Payment card markets are also imperfect because of limited information. 
For example, it is often impossible to determine how a fraud was 
perpetrated and therefore who would have been the least cost avoider. 
Epstein and Brown assume something close to a perfect market in 
payment systems, noting the “high level of competition that exists 
everywhere in the credit card industry.”18 Market realities are quite 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. at 209. 
 12. Id. at 219. 
 13. See id. at 209, 219, 223. It is unclear whether Epstein and Brown would envisage payment 
card companies actually bargaining with individual consumers or whether they would simply 
present consumers with contracts of adhesion in which fraud loss rules were one of many non-
negotiable components of a package offer. 
 14. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 27–44 (1994) (presenting a critique of the 
first fundamental theorem of welfare economics). 
 15. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14–15 (1960). 
 16. See generally Mark D. Flood, An Introduction to Complete Markets, FED. RES. BANK OF 
ST. LOUIS REV., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 32 (explaining incomplete markets, futures, and hedged risks). 
 17. See generally LEXISNEXIS FRAUD STUDY, supra note 1. 
 18. Epstein & Brown, supra note 9, at 203. 
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different.19 Some parts of payment cards markets are intensely competitive, 
while others are not.20 Payment card networks—MasterCard, Visa, Amex, 
Discover, and around a dozen relatively small personal-identification-
number (PIN)-debit networks—are two-sided networks.21 Network effects, 
combined with the need to roll out payment networks nationally, at the very 
least, create high barriers to entry for new networks.22 Further, while there 
are numerous card issuers and acquirers, the market is heavily concentrated 
in a handful of institutions. The five (ten) largest card issuers account for 
74% (90%) of the credit card market and 43% (51%) of the debit card 
market in terms of purchase volume.23 More critically, the mere fact that 
there are numerous competitors does not mean that there is competition 
along every axis of the market. For example, competition may exist for 
market share or for price, but not for security. 
Payment card systems also involve a variety of participants with 
divergent incentives. This creates intense coordination problems. The 
networks lead the coordination efforts, but they are driven by their own 
incentives, primarily to increase the size of the network.24 As long as fraud 
remains sufficiently low that it does not damage the network’s reputation, 
the network’s primary concern is maximizing total transaction volume, 
irrespective of whether the transactions are fraudulent.25 Increasing the size 
of the network is a function of calibrating the network’s cost allocation 
(including fraud) to fully leverage network participants’ price elasticity.26 
Fraud liability is a cost of using a payment system and is therefore a 
type of pricing affected by the level of competition in the market. 
Therefore, more price inelastic participants (those whose demand for a 
payment system’s services is the least sensitive to price changes) might bear 
a larger share of fraud losses, regardless of whether they are the least cost 
avoiders of the fraud. By allocating fraud losses to the most price inelastic 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1356–63 (2008) [hereinafter Levitin, Economic Costs]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1387. 
 22. Id. at 1386–87; see also JOHN M. GALLAUGHER, INFORMATION SYSTEMS: A MANAGER’S 
GUIDE TO HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY (2010), available at http://www.flatworldknowledge.com/ 
pub/1.0/information-systems-manager%E2%80%99s-/206326#web-206326. 
 23. See THE NILSON REP. ISSUE 919 (Feb. 2009); THE NILSON REP. ISSUE 918 (Jan. 2009); 
THE NILSON REP. ISSUE 917 (Jan. 2009); Adam J. Levitin, Interchange Regulation: Implications 
for Credit Unions, FILENE RESEARCH INST., Nov. 24, 2010, at 1, 39, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/levitin_filene_paper.pdf. 
 24. See generally Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1356–59, 1364–65, 1398 
(detailing ways that networks coordinate their systems to raise revenue and discussing the 
negative network effect of negative externality). 
 25. See generally David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. 
L. REV. 373, 393 (1990) (discussing the nonlegal sanction of loss of reputation among market 
participants); Schwartz & Janger, supra note 6, at 929–32 (discussing the cost and associated 
pressures of reputational sanctions). 
 26. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1364–66. 
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party, the number of network participants is maximized, but deadweight 
loss may occur if the most price inelastic network participant is not also the 
least cost avoider of fraud. 
Previous work on payment systems has viewed fraud liability rules as 
unconnected with competition issues.27 Thus, in their groundbreaking paper 
on the economics of payment system loss allocation rules, written well 
before the emergence of major payment card antitrust litigation, Professors 
Robert D. Cooter and Edward L. Rubin noted that “[t]he structure of the 
financial services industry may cause market failures, such as oligopolistic 
or monopolistic behavior, but these tend to affect pricing rather than loss 
allocation.”28 Ironically, though, one of the sources Cooter and Rubin cited 
for this was the seminal paper on credit card interchange fee competition.29 
While Cooter and Rubin viewed loss allocation as a distinct issue from 
pricing, a major point of this Article is that loss allocation is itself a type of 
pricing and cannot be viewed as unaffected by antitrust matters. 
This Article argues that the rules for allocating payment card fraud loss 
are likely to be suboptimal because they are shaped by discrepancies in 
market participants’ bargaining power. In payment card networks there is 
not unfettered bargaining over fraud loss allocation. Instead of Coasean 
bargaining, there is merely fiat ordering by the most powerful party in the 
network—the network association itself—which is interested in maximizing 
total transaction volume, rather than total nonfraudulent transaction 
volume.30 In such circumstances, we should be skeptical that private 
ordering achieves socially efficient outcomes. Instead, in a market replete 
with competition and information problems, private disordering may obtain, 
and, with it, negative social externalities. 
To this end, the Article reviews payment card network fraud liability 
allocation rules, focusing on Visa and MasterCard, the two largest payment 
card issuers that, combined, accounted for 84% of the total U.S. payment 
card (debit, credit, and prepaid) market in purchase transaction volume in 
2008.31 It shows that liability allocations among card network participants 
are likely inefficient as they often place liability on parties with little or no 
ability to prevent fraud.32 The Article also notes international variation in 
liability rules and security measures, and the fraud arbitrage problems that 
stem from these variations. International inconsistency in liability rules and 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Professor Ronald Mann has recognized this point implicitly in his comparative study of 
credit cards in the United States and Japan. See Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards, supra note 
8, at 1088–99 (discussing impact of fraud rates on merchant fees). 
 28. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 8, at 68 n.30. 
 29. See id. (citing William Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and 
Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541, 554–55, 586–88 (1983)). 
 30. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1334–38. 
 31. THE NILSON REP. ISSUE 924, at 8 (Apr. 2009) (comparing 2008 “Totals” for Visa and 
Mastercard “Credit” and “Debit & Prepaid” categories against 2008 “Credit & Debit Totals”). 
 32. See Douglass, supra note 9, at 46–47. 
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security measures for the same companies in virtually identical markets 
suggests that private ordering may not be producing optimal results 
globally.33 
While private ordering may not produce optimal results, regulatory 
intervention poses its own problems. Regulators are subject to their own 
idiosyncratic concerns and pressures, and they also lack perfect 
information.34 Yet, if regulatory intervention cannot achieve optimal 
outcomes, it might still help optimize market outcomes. Thoughtful 
regulatory intervention can compensate for some of the bargaining power 
disparities and help achieve an outcome that is closer to that which would 
obtain in a complete, perfectly competitive market. 
Accordingly, this Article argues for two complimentary regulatory 
interventions. First, broader-based payment card security measure 
coordination should be encouraged. The current coordination mechanism 
for payment card security—the Payment Card Industry Security Standards 
Council—features a governance structure that does not adequately represent 
all interests in payment card networks or provide them with due process. As 
a result, the Council is perceived as being an instrumentality for the card 
networks to reinforce the placement of liability on the most price inelastic 
type of network participant, rather than engaging in effective reforms. To 
this end, it might be necessary for payment card security coordination to be 
conducted under a federal aegis.35 
Second, card networks should be encouraged to compete more 
vigorously for merchants, be this through legislation or rulemaking or 
through antitrust enforcement of payment card network rules pertaining to 
merchant pricing.36 Fraud costs are part of pricing.37 While the huge 
transaction costs in coordinating multiple parties in payment card networks 
defeats true Coasean bargaining, better price competition among networks 
for merchants will help achieve a result closer to the Coasean ideal.  
The Article also presents a defense of the federal limitation on 
consumer liability.38 The federal limitation creates a moral hazard and 
constrains the range of potential bargaining.39 It is tempered, however, 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See infra pp. 22–30. 
 34. Once we accept that the market is flawed, however, there is no inherent reason to favor 
market solutions over regulatory ones. Both systems might produce suboptimal outcomes, and we 
have no way of ascertaining which system is more likely to do so or whether an outcome is in fact 
optimal. In such circumstances, there is no good reason to fall back on anti-regulatory priors. 
Instead, when efficiency proves an indeterminate metric, it must be jettisoned for a metric, such as 
political accountability. 
 35. See infra pp. 30–32. 
 36. See infra pp. 32–36. 
 37. See Gillete & Walt, supra note 8, at 500; Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: 
America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERK. BUS. 
L.J. 265, 273–74 (2005). 
 38. See infra Part IV. 
 39. Douglass, supra note 9, at 46. 
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through monetary and nonmonetary deductibles and copayments and 
reflects a reasonable response to an adverse selection problem and to the 
enormous informational and bargaining cost asymmetries between 
consumers and card issuers regarding fraud risk, as well as to consumers’ 
limited ability to prevent most third-party fraud and limited ability to bear 
losses relative to other payment card network participants. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the 
structure of payment card networks and their loss allocation rules in the 
United States. Part II questions whether the liability rules do in fact result in 
a Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcome. Part III considers possible and existing 
regulatory interventions to level the playing field and move payment card 
networks closer to Coasean bargaining outcomes. Part IV examines the 
consumer loss liability rules and presents a defense of the federal 
limitations on consumer liability of unauthorized transactions. 
An important introductory note: this Article focuses solely on the issue 
of allocation of losses for unauthorized transactions. It does not generally 
address the related issues of liability for compromised payment data storage 
or data transmission that results in fraud losses for others. Data security 
breaches have become a major issue in payment card security in recent 
years. Whether there should be some form of tort liability for data security 
breaches, whether liability should be set by private ordering, what the 
liability standard should be, and whether compliance with industry 
standards such as Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard would be 
sufficient to relieve liability are important questions.40  
Ultimately, however, flaws in data storage or data transmission only 
matter to the extent that unauthorized transactions can occur. The data have 
no inherent value; the data’s attraction to fraudsters derives solely from 
their ability to capitalize on it, and using it for fraudulent transactions is the 
most immediate way to do so.41 Thus, data breach liability is better 
conceived as liability for potential fraud and the steps that must be taken to 
reduce the likelihood that the breach will translate into fraud, such as 
reissuance of cards with new numbers following a breach. It is also often 
difficult to trace the unauthorized use of a card to a particular data security 
breach, which makes the liability relationship more tenuous.42 To be sure, 
there are improvements that can and should be made in data storage and 
transmission—tokenization and end-to-end encryption should both be 
pursued vigorously.43 But those improvements will not eliminate fraud 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Cf. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.) (suggesting that industry 
standard is not necessarily the proper standard of diligence as “a whole calling may have unduly 
lagged in the adoption of new and available devices”). 
 41. Not all data breach issues even relate to payments, although payment data is the most 
readily monetizable type of data. 
 42. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 108, 110. 
 43. Tokenization is a data fortification strategy. It is meant to address the problem of data 
residing in relatively vulnerable locations, such as with retailers. Tokenization means that data 
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problems. Better data protection will make it harder to get the data 
necessary to commit certain types of fraud, but the critical line of fraud 
defense for all third-party fraud is transaction authorization. 
I. PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS AND LIABILITY RULES 
A. STRUCTURE OF PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS 
Payment card transactions all involve multi-party networks of financial 
institutions, consumers, and merchants. Transmission of a payment from a 
consumer to a merchant to pay for goods or services is conducted through at 
least three financial institutions: the consumer’s bank (the issuer bank), the 
merchant’s bank (the acquirer bank), and the card network association 
(MasterCard, Visa, Amex, Discover, or PIN debit network) that 
intermediates between the banks and sets the rules governing their 
transactions. Thus, a payment card transaction involves at least five parties, 
although in the case of American Express and Discover,44 the card network 
is often also the card issuer and the acquirer. (See Figure 1). 
         Figure 1. Payment Card Network Structure 
 
 
Often a payment card transaction involves additional parties. Acquirers 
frequently outsource all but the financing element of their operations. The 
task of recruiting merchant customers for the acquirer is often outsourced to 
an independent sales organization (ISO), and all the technical linkages 
between the merchant and the card network association are often outsourced 
                                                                                                                 
resides in harder-to-hack “fortified” locations; merchants would only retain a “token” number that 
links to the data stored off-site. Instead of residing with merchants, who do not specialize in data 
security, tokenization moves the data to companies with expertise and reputational capital (and 
potentially insurance policies) that guarantee data protection. End-to-end encryption means that 
card data is never transmitted in an unencrypted form. 
 44. Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1328. 
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to a separate data processor.45 For Internet transactions a separate gateway 
provider might also be involved.46 
In a payment card transaction, the consumer must first transfer 
information about the consumer’s account (either funded or a line of credit) 
to the merchant, or more precisely, to the merchant’s acquirer or data 
processor. This can be done in several ways. The information can be 
transferred electronically via a magnetic swipe. The information can be 
transferred electronically via radio-frequency identity (RFID) chip 
(“contactless”). The information can be transferred physically via an 
impression made by an imprinter (a “knucklebuster”). The information can 
be transferred orally and recorded by hand. The information can be 
transferred in a written form, as occurs in mail-order transactions. Or the 
information can be transferred electronically via a Web site. Some 
transactions require additional information (such as a PIN number or a ZIP 
code) to be conveyed via a PIN pad. 
Once this information is conveyed to the merchant, it is then relayed to 
the credit card network by the merchant’s processor for authorization, 
capture, and settlement (ACS).47 Authorization involves the card network 
first verifying that the card is real and then the issuer approving the 
transaction. Once a transaction has been authorized, it may then be 
captured. 
Capture involves the transfer of funds from the issuer bank to the 
acquirer bank. The transfer is done between the institutions’ accounts at the 
card network association, which serves as a clearinghouse for the 
payments.48 The issuer transfers to the acquirer the amount of the 
transaction minus a fee, known as the interchange fee.49 The interchange fee 
is set by the network and varies by the type and size of the merchant, the 
type of card (consumer or commercial, credit or debit), and the level of 
rewards on the card.50 The card network also takes out various fees to cover 
its costs of processing the transaction plus its profit margin.51 Thus, the 
network debits the issuer’s account for the amount of the transaction less 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See Ramon P. DeGennaro, Merchant Acquirers and Payment Card Processors: A Look 
Inside the Black Box, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., 1Q 2006, at 27, 31. 
 46. Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 45 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5 n. 13 (2008) [hereinafter Levitin, Social Costs]. 
 47. Sometimes the merchant never actually has control over the data, which instead goes 
straight to the processor. 
 48. DeGennaro, supra note 45, at 33. 
 49. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-558, CREDIT AND DEBIT CARDS: 
FEDERAL ENTITIES ARE TAKING ACTIONS TO LIMIT THEIR INTERCHANGE FEES, BUT 
ADDITIONAL REVENUE COLLECTION COST SAVINGS MAY EXIST 1 (2008). 
 50. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1333. 
 51. Historically, MasterCard and Visa were mutual organizations owned by their member 
institutions. Accordingly, they only charged a “switch” fee to cover their costs of processing 
transactions. Since becoming publicly-traded stock companies, however, MasterCard and Visa 
have needed to operate on a for-profit basis and have added additional fees. 
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the interchange fee and credits the acquirer bank’s account for the 
transaction amount minus both interchange and network fees. 
Finally, the transaction is settled, meaning that the acquirer credits the 
merchant’s account with the funds representing the transaction amount 
minus its own fee, called the merchant discount fee. The merchant discount 
fee is set to cover the interchange fee and network fees paid by the acquirer, 
as well as the acquirers’ other costs and a profit margin. Frequently the 
merchant discount fee is explicitly priced as “interchange plus”—as a 
spread over the applicable interchange and network fees—making 
interchange and network fees functionally pass-thru fees to the merchant.52 
When a transaction is reversed (referred to as a “chargeback”), the 
system works backwards.53 The acquirer transfers funds from the 
merchant’s account to its account and then to the network. These funds are 
captured in the issuer’s account. The issuer then settles the funds back in 
the consumer’s account. Chargebacks generally involve their own set of 
additional fees from the network to the acquirer and thence from the 
acquirer to the merchant.54 The interchange and network fees on the original 
transaction are not always refunded to the merchant when there is a 
chargeback.55 
Payment card networks are “two-sided networks,”56 meaning that they 
have two distinct types of end customers: merchants and consumers. 
Payment card networks are unique among two-sided networks, however, in 
that they have not only two different types of end customers, but also two 
different types of intermediate customers: acquirers and issuers. The 
existence of these four different types of customers significantly 
complicates the economic workings of payment card networks. 
In a two-sided network, the value of participating in the network to one 
type of customer depends on how many of the other type of customer are 
participating. For example, heterosexual bars and newspaper classifieds are 
both examples of two-sided networks. At heterosexual bars, the appeal of 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Interchange Reimbursement Fees, MERCHANT COUNCIL, http://www.merchantcouncil.org/ 
merchant-account-information/rates-fees.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). A “blended rate” that 
gives merchants a single merchant discount rate, regardless of the particular mix of interchange 
rates on the cards used, is a common alternative, especially for smaller merchants. Id. (Enhanced 
Recover Reducer (ERR)). 
 53. Chargebacks & Dispute Resolution: Chargeback Cycle, VISA, http://usa.visa.com/mercha 
nts/operations/chargebacks_dispute_resolution/chargeback_cycle.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). 
 54. Merchant Card Processing: Frequently Asked Questions, BANK OF AMERICA, 
http://www.bankofamerica.com/small_business/merchant_card_processing/index.cfm?template=f
aqs#cb_2 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). 
 55. See generally MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, CHARGEBACK GUIDE (Apr. 16, 2010) 
[hereinafter MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE]. 
 56. But see Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, Transaction Costs, Externalities, and “Two-
Sided” Payment Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 617, 626–31 (arguing that the concept of 
two-sided markets is insufficiently defined and that most markets can be described as two-sided 
because consumers benefit from the supply created in response to the demand of other 
consumers). 
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the bar to men depends on the number of women present and vice-versa. 
Straight men do not want to go to bars populated only by other straight 
men, and straight women do not want to go to bars populated only by other 
straight women. Likewise, newspaper classifieds are of interest to 
advertisers based on the number of readers and to readers based on the 
number of advertisers. Advertisers want classified readers and classified 
readers want advertisers. Similarly, the value of being a cardholder in a 
payment card network depends on the number of merchants in the network 
and vice-versa. 
In card networks, as with other two-sided networks, the increase in 
marginal value from greater network participation diminishes as the 
network grows. It is of little consequence to a consumer if a card network 
has 50 million or 50 million and one merchants in the network. Once a 
network is sufficiently well established, its marginal size is of limited 
importance to its value to its participants. 
A multi-bank payment card network like MasterCard or Visa (and 
American Express and Discover for their third-party issuers) has a more 
delicate balancing act to maintain than simply achieving a balance between 
the two types of end-users, consumers and merchants. Multi-bank networks 
also have to ensure participation of a sufficient number of both issuers and 
acquirers in order to ultimately optimize and grow end-user participation.57 
The existence of both intermediate customers and end-customers for 
payment card networks further complicates the dependency. The value of a 
network to the intermediate customers—issuers and acquirers—depends not 
on the number of the other type of intermediate customer, but on the 
number of the other type of intermediate customer’s end-customer. 
Acquirers care about the number of cardholders in the network, and issuers 
care about the number of merchants.58 This is not the case for the end-
customers. It is irrelevant to consumers and merchants how many 
intermediate customers (issuers and acquirers) are in the network;59 instead, 
network value depends on the numerosity (and geographic and industry 
concentration) of the other type of end-customer.60 
Price elasticities—willingness to pay—for network services are likely 
to differ between customer types in a two-sided network. Because the value 
of the network to its participants depends on increasing the size of both 
sides of the network, pricing of access to the network involves allocating 
network costs to the different types of participants according to their price 
elasticity in order to maximize the size, and hence value, of the network.61 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See id. at 631–37. 
 58. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1377. 
 59. Consumers care about the number of issuers of cards in general, but for reasons related to 
competition for card provision, rather than network dynamics. 
 60. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1364–65. 
 61. Id. 
14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
A central role of the network association is to coordinate optimal 
participation in the network through price manipulation, both in terms of 
direct monetary pricing and indirect pricing through network rules that 
impose liability on network participants for losses or limit network 
participants’ ability to reallocate costs to other network participants.62 
For merchants, these costs are the merchant discount fee, any sunk 
equipment fees, and fees to ISOs and processors, as well as the costs of 
fraud. For consumers using a credit card, these costs are an annual fee (if 
any), the costs of revolving a balance, ancillary fees (over-limit, late, cash 
advance, foreign transaction, e.g.), and the costs of fraud.63 For consumers 
using a debit card, the costs are account maintenance fees (if any), overdraft 
fees (if any), and the costs of fraud. For merchants and consumers, fraud 
costs are part of the total cost of participating in a payment card network. 
Fraud liability is a price component, just not one that is explicitly priced. 
Payment card network associations do not have contractual privity with 
the end-users of the networks.64 Accordingly, they do not have direct 
control over the total price for the end-users. They may exercise this control 
only indirectly through their pricing and rules for issuers and acquirers. 
These prices and rules set a floor for the pricing and rules that issuers and 
acquirers apply to their respective end-users, consumers, and merchants. 
While the payment card networks’ rules technically bind only the card 
networks’ member institutions—issuer and acquirer banks—the costs are 
passed on to the end-users to the extent permitted by law (and card 
association rules).65 
B. PAYMENT CARD LIABILITY RULES IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, the liability for unauthorized payment card 
transactions is allocated partially by statute and partially by private 
ordering. Federal law generally limits individual consumer liability for 
unauthorized transactions to $50 for credit and debit cards, albeit with 
important exceptions discussed in Part IV, infra.66 The liability of 
merchants and financial institutions is determined through private ordering 
under payment card network rules. The payment card networks’ rules 
technically bind only the card networks’ member institutions—issuer and 
acquirer banks. Acquirers, however, uniformly pass on their liability to their 
merchants by contract, sometimes adding fees. 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. at 1334–38 (describing network rules that restrict merchants’ ability to reallocate costs 
to consumers). 
 63. Consumers bear the cost of interchange indirectly in the form of higher prices or reduced 
merchant services. See Levitin, Social Costs, supra note 46, at 27–37. 
 64. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1327–31. 
 65. See id. at 1334–39. 
 66. See supra note 4. 
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All payment card networks have substantially identical rules,67 although 
there is variation in the often inscrutable details. In certain circumstances, 
the issuer is allowed to chargeback the transaction to the acquirer, thereby 
putting loss liability on the acquirer.68 The card networks’ rules governing 
chargebacks are extremely complicated and run hundreds of pages long, but 
they can largely be summarized as follows: for card-present transactions, 
where the merchant can physically examine the card and obtain a signature 
or PIN code, the issuer bears all liability for unauthorized transactions, 
provided that the merchant followed the required security steps. These steps 
generally involve inspection of the card, obtaining authorization from the 
issuer for the transaction, and obtaining a signature from the cardholder.69 
Signatures, as we shall see, are not authorization devices, but ex post loss 
allocation devices. Card-present transactions include any transaction in 
which the card is physically swiped at a magnetic stripe (mag stripe) reader 
in the presence of the merchant’s employee, and is imprinted on a 
“knucklebuster” or otherwise physically handled by the merchant. Some 
networks also include small ticket (“No Signature Required”) transactions 
and contactless or “proximity” RFID transactions in this category.70 For 
card-not-present (CNP) transactions, such as mail-order and telephone-
order (MOTO) or Internet transactions, the acquirer (and hence the 
merchant) bears all liability for unauthorized transactions.71 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, MASTERCARD RULES (May 12, 2010) [hereinafter 
MASTERCARD RULES]; VISA, INT’L OPERATING REGULATIONS (Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter VISA 
INT’L REGULATIONS]; AMERICAN EXPRESS, MERCH. REGULATIONS—U.S. (Apr. 2010); 
DISCOVER, MERCHANT OPERATING REGULATIONS, RELEASE 10.2 (Apr. 16, 2010) [hereinafter 
DISCOVER MERCHANT OPERATING REGULATIONS]. 
 68. See, e.g., VISA, INT’L OPERATING REGULATIONS—DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 20 
(Nov. 2, 2009), available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operating-
regulations-dispute-resolution-rules.pdf [hereinafter VISA DISPUTE PROCEDURES]. 
 69. Id. at 100–02. Gas station pump transactions, which require a physical card to be swiped, 
do not qualify as “card-present” because there is no physical examination of the card by a station 
employee. 
 70. See id. at 102–03; AMERICAN EXPRESS, MERCH. REGULATIONS—U.S. (Oct. 2009) § 
4.6.2., at 31. The shifting of fraud liability from merchants to issuers for these types of 
transactions is to foster merchant acceptance of contactless and signature-free transactions, which 
issuers might anticipate resulting in larger ticket transactions because of the seamlessness of the 
spending process. 
 71. VISA DISPUTE PROCEDURES, supra note 68, at 112–13. There are some important 
exceptions to this rule. For example Visa puts the loss on the issuer if the merchant shipped 
merchandise and the issuer did not participate in its Address Verification Service. Id. at 114–15. 
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II. WHAT HATH PRIVATE ORDERING WROUGHT? 
A. WHO IS THE LEAST COST AVOIDER? CARD-PRESENT 
TRANSACTIONS 
In a world of perfect markets, liability for a harm is optimally allocated 
to the least cost avoider of that harm.72 The fact that payment cards are two-
sided networks is irrelevant to the application of the least cost avoider 
principle; allocating the loss to the least cost avoider is the efficient 
outcome, regardless of varying price elasticities between merchants and 
card issuers. This can be seen from considering how the total value of a 
payment system to its participants varies with fraud loss allocation. The 
total value (V) of a payment system to its participants is equal to their 
collective net benefit from the system excluding fraud costs (E) minus fraud 
costs (F). Thus, V=E-F. We can refine this as V=EMerchant+EBank-FMerchant-
FBank. 
The values of FMerchant and FBank depend on which party is liable for 
fraud. If a party is not liable, then its fraud costs are zero. For simplicity’s 
sake, assume that fraud costs can either be allocated wholly to the merchant 
or wholly to the issuer bank, but not shared. Therefore, if the costs are 
allocated wholly to the merchant, FBank= 0, and if the costs are allocated 
wholly to the card issuer, then FMerchant=0. 
Thus, the value maximizing proposition depends on whether 
EMerchant+EBank-FMerchant >?< EMerchant+EBank-FBank, which means it depends on 
whether the issuer bank and the merchant are liable, FBank>?<FMerchant. The 
relative values of FBank and FMerchant depend on how cheaply each party can 
avoid fraud, as F, the total costs of fraud, is the sum of fraud losses plus 
fraud avoidance expenses. If the merchant can avoid fraud more cheaply 
then the issuer bank, then FBank>FMerchant, and V will be maximized by 
placing liability on the merchant, whereas if the issuer bank can avoid fraud 
more cheaply, then FBank<FMerchant, and V will be maximized by placing 
liability on the issuer bank. 
The key point to see here is that E is irrelevant to the outcome. E is the 
net benefit that the network’s participants derive from participating 
(excluding fraud costs). The participants’ maximum willingness to pay in 
the absence of fraud costs—the limit to their price elasticity—must equal E, 
as they will not pay beyond the net benefit received. This means that the 
network participants’ price elasticity is irrelevant for the application of the 
least cost avoider principle. Even in a two-sided network, then, the least 
cost avoider principle is unaltered. 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 136–38 (1970) (exploring the least cost avoider in a typical car and pedestrian 
accident). 
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So, are fraud losses in payment card networks allocated to the least cost 
avoider? Are the card networks’ fraud loss allocation rules efficient? 
For card-present transactions, the rules place the loss on the issuer, 
unless the merchant has failed to follow some basic steps in inspecting the 
card and obtaining a signature or PIN (with exceptions for proximity and 
no-signature small ticket transactions).73 Consider how this allocation 
applies in the five basic card-present fraud situations:74 
1. The “friendly fraud” or “first-party fraud” scenario, when a real 
cardholder uses his or her card to obtain goods or services and then 
denies having authorized the transaction or otherwise claims that the 
transaction was defective (by claiming nondelivery of goods or 
nonconforming merchandise, e.g.). 
2. The “stolen card” scenario, when a card is stolen and used by the thief 
(or a taker from the thief) to perform a transaction. The card is a real 
card being used by an unauthorized user. 
3. The “fraudulent issuance” scenario, when a transaction is performed 
on a real card that was issued based on fraudulent information 
(typically to a fictitious individual). The card is a real card being used 
by an authorized (but fake) user. 
4. The “real account, counterfeit card” scenario, where the transaction is 
performed using a counterfeit card that uses real data copied from an 
actual card. The card is a fake card, but the user is an authorized user. 
5. The “fake account, counterfeit card” scenario, where a transaction is 
performed using a counterfeit card that uses generated data that does 
not match any actual account (but often partially matches with 
fraudster). This is a fake card with an unauthorized user. 
For situation one, the “friendly fraud” or “first-party fraud” scenario, 
the least cost avoider is the consumer. If it can be shown that the consumer 
did in fact perform the transaction, the consumer will bear the liability 
(assuming the consumer can be found and is solvent). In this scenario, there 
is no particular care that either the merchant or the issuer can take to avoid 
the fraud ex-ante. The transaction is indistinguishable from a legitimate 
purchase until the cardholder denies having made the transaction. At that 
point, the question is whether there is sufficient proof that the transaction 
was in fact properly authorized. Proof of authorization depends on the 
authorization method. If the merchant follows authorization protocols, then 
the issuer is the least cost avoider, as the issuer controls the authorization 
procedures. Accordingly, if the first-party fraud cannot be proven, the issuer 
                                                                                                                 
 73. VISA DISPUTE PROCEDURES, supra note 68, at 100–07. 
 74. This Article does not address the various merchant-initiated fraud situations that can arise, 
including factoring for money laundering purposes. 
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bears the liability in the card-present environment. This means that liability 
rests on the least cost avoider. 
For situation two, the “stolen card” scenario, if the consumer received 
the card, then the consumer is likely the least cost avoider, at least until the 
point that the card’s theft is reported, at which point the issuer is the least 
cost avoider as the issuer can simply deactivate the card and deny any 
authorization requests.75 Likewise, if the consumer did not receive the card 
because it was intercepted by a fraudster, then the issuer would be the least 
cost avoider as the issuer controls the card activation procedures. 
The merchant is unlikely to be the least cost avoider for a stolen or 
intercepted card. The merchant might be able to recognize a card as stolen 
based on an obvious mismatch of the user and the name on the card—such 
as if Dolly Parton used Barack Obama’s credit card—but card network 
rules do not expect merchants to catch obvious mismatches, and the 
merchant may generally not demand identification as a condition of 
accepting the card.76 
Card network rules do generally require merchants to compare the 
signature on the charge slip with the specimen signature on the card,77 but 
signature matching is an art, not a science, at least when practiced by store 
clerks, and is of little use in preventing fraud. The signature of a harried 
consumer, such as one in a grocery line attempting to soothe a bevy of 
bawling toddlers, is likely to vary significantly from a calmly written 
specimen. In a typical commercial context, the store clerk never examines 
the card in any way, not least because it is not an efficient use of the clerk’s 
time. Even if a merchant’s employees were diligent in examining 
signatures, the fraud reduction savings would likely be minimal. These 
savings would also be unlikely to offset the costs to the merchant from 
slower transaction speed at the register, namely the loss of sales because of 
greater transaction costs for customers due to increased wait times at the 
register or the cost of hiring more employees to work at the register. As 
                                                                                                                 
 75. The major exception is the small minority of U.S. card transactions that are not authorized 
in real time (e.g., knucklebuster or telephone transactions). In those cases, the merchant may have 
parted with the merchandise before obtaining an authorization. When a merchant delivers without 
having obtained prior authorization, then the merchant is the least cost avoider. 
 76. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 5.8.4, at 5-17; VISA INT’L REGULATIONS, supra 
note 67, at 468 (only requiring merchant review of additional identification where the signature 
panel is blank). The merchant may also require the cardholder’s address or ZIP code for certain 
transactions. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67; VISA INT’L REGULATIONS, supra note 67, at 
469. Discover requires merchants to examine two pieces of identification, one of which must be 
government issued for authorizing transactions on unsigned cards, but its rules are silent regarding 
examination of extrinsic identification for signed cards. See DISCOVER MERCHANT OPERATING 
REGULATIONS, supra note 67, § 3.1.2.1. 
 77. See, e.g., MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 55, §§ 2.1.6.3.1–3.2; VISA INT’L 
REGULATIONS, supra note 67, at 463–64; DISCOVER MERCHANT OPERATING REGULATIONS, 
supra note 67, §§ 3.1.2–3.1.2.1. 
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with situation one, the ultimate least cost avoider in a stolen/lost card 
scenario is the issuer, and that is where liability rests. 
In situation three, involving a fraudulently issued card, the issuer is the 
least cost avoider. There is no real consumer, and the merchant has even 
less ability to detect the fraud than with a stolen card, as the card 
information, including the signature, can be tailored to match that of the 
fraudster using the card. Again, the least cost avoider is liable. 
In situation four, “real account, counterfeit card,” it is not clear who is 
the least cost avoider. As the counterfeit card is made using real consumer 
data, data protection is the critical issue for preventing this type of fraud. 
The least cost avoider for data protection varies as data flows through the 
transaction process and is also retained for various purposes. But even with 
optimal data protection, there is still the possibility of “skimming”—the 
recording of card data from a magnetic stripe when the card is tendered to a 
merchant’s employee (a particular problem in restaurants).78 The skimmed 
data is then encoded onto a counterfeit card (or used in card-not-present 
transactions). 
Thus for “real account, counterfeit card” the least cost avoider largely 
depends on how the fraudster obtained the real account information. 
Depending on how the information was obtained, the consumer, issuer, 
merchant or acquirer/processor could be at fault. Once the information is in 
circulation, however, the ability to prevent the counterfeiting largely 
depends on the issuer and the network and the security features they require 
for physical cards. The merchant is unlikely to detect the counterfeit. The 
merchant has no particular skill or ability to detect a counterfeit card 
beyond a blatantly poor forgery. This means the merchant has virtually no 
ability to stop the fraud. As the issuer controls the physical design of the 
card, and hence the ease of counterfeiting, the issuer is the least cost 
avoider, and yet again, the issuer is liable. 
In situation five, with a counterfeit card using fake account information, 
the least cost avoider is likely the issuer. In this situation there is no actual 
consumer, and the merchant has little ability to detect the forgery. While the 
network and issuer have control over the physical characteristics of the 
card, which affect ease of counterfeiting, the issuer must authorize the 
transaction, and if the card does not match an existing account number, the 
issuer can easily deny the transaction. As with the other card-present 
scenarios, the issuer is the least cost avoider and is liable. 
For card-present transactions, the least cost avoider may vary somewhat 
situationally, but it is typically the issuer. It makes sense to require the 
merchant to take basic anti-fraud steps and, if followed, place the loss on 
the issuer, who is then the least cost avoider. This is exactly what card 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See Facciolo, supra note 8, at 629. 
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network rules mandate. Thus, the current arrangement of loss allocation for 
card-present rules seems largely sensible. 
B. WHO IS THE LEAST COST AVOIDER? CARD-NOT-PRESENT 
TRANSACTIONS 
Card-not-present transactions present a different story. CNP liability 
rules are a product of the historical development of payment card markets. 
When card networks first began, there were no CNP transactions. All 
transactions required physical presentment of the card, and the issuer bore 
the risk of unauthorized transactions (as explained above) as merchants 
were unwilling to assume fraud risk for a nascent technology over which 
they had little control.79 
Merchants, however, wanted to be able to take cards for mail-order and 
telephone-order (MOTO) transactions, where no card would be presented 
physically.80 Issuers were reluctant to assume fraud risk for these 
transactions, even if the expiry date was used as a password and 
merchandise was required to be sent to the cardholder’s billing address.81 
Merchants concluded that the gains from these transactions outweighed the 
fraud risks, so they agreed to assume liability for unauthorized MOTO 
transactions82 (certainly it was no riskier for them than shipping before a 
check was received and cleared). 
The fraud liability rules made sense in their historical origins. Today, 
however, they are less sensible, as most CNP transactions are not MOTO, 
but Internet transactions. Historically, card fraud involved situations one 
through four (friendly fraud, stolen card, fraudulent issuance, counterfeit 
card using actual information), but not situation five (new account fraud). 
Fraudsters would obtain the card or card data of a real cardholder and 
would use it to purchase goods that would be shipped to the fraudster. 
Contemporary fraud involves both existing account fraud and new account 
fraud.83 
The problem with CNP liability rules is that they do not account for 
changed circumstances. Now, as before, merchants have little ability to 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Admittedly, until the 1970s, fraud prevention for card-present transactions was also quite 
difficult, as transactions were not authorized in real time. See ROSS J. ANDERSON, SECURITY 
ENGINEERING: A GUIDE TO BUILDING DEPENDABLE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 394–95 (Carol A. 
Long, ed., 2001); Steve Mott, Perhaps It’s Time to Mothball the Mighty Mag-Stripe, PYMTS 
(2010), http://www.pymnts.com/perhaps-it-s-time-to-mothball-the-mighty-mag-stripe. 
 80. See ANDERSON, supra note 79, at 394. 
 81. Id. at 394. 
 82. See CYBERSOURCE, MANAGING RISK ON THE NET WHITE PAPER: WHAT INTERNET 
MERCHANTS NEED TO KNOW 2 (2000), available at http://www.cybersource.com/resources/colla 
teral/pdf/ifs_wp111500.pdf. 
 83. Joseph Campana, Identity Theft: More than Account Fraud: What Everyone Should Know 
1 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.jcampana.com/JCampana 
Documents/IdentityTheftMoreThanAccountFraud.pdf. 
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prevent CNP fraud in any of these situations. The merchant’s role in the 
transaction is limited to requiring whatever information the network and/or 
issuer require. The merchant has no ability to verify the information or the 
identity of the customer.84 Moreover, CNP merchants face substantially 
higher interchange rates than card-present (CP) merchants in addition to a 
different set of fraud rules.85  
Issuers’ ability to prevent CNP fraud, however, has changed 
dramatically. Advances in card security arguably make CNP transactions 
safer than CP transactions.86 In a CNP transaction, it is easy to require the 
cardholder to transmit not only the card account data and the Card 
Verification Value (CVV),87 which is written on the back of the card and 
not included in the card number on the front or on the mag stripe, but also 
the billing address, billing telephone, or e-mail address information. If 
additional information beyond the card account data—the account number, 
the account holder’s name, and the expiry data—is required, then a 
fraudster needs more than the physical card (which is easy to forge given 
that mag stripe technology is now over thirty years old88) or a copy of the 
face of the card to use the card successfully. 
Accordingly, the issuer has the ability to prevent at least some CNP 
fraud. The issuer can first verify the information supplied to the merchant to 
ensure that it is a real account and that the card information matches the 
CVV code on the back of the card. Second, the issuer can verify the billing 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See Mann, Making Sense of Payments, supra note 8, at 6771 (noting that in CNP settings, 
merchants lack a “credible mechanism for verifying the identity of the purported cardholder”). 
 85. See DELL LETTER, supra note 3, at Appendix 1 (listing the “Differential Between Card 
Present and Card Not Present Visa Debit Interchange Fees”); Letter from Paul Misener, Vice 
President for Global Pub. Policy, Amazon.com, to Louise L. Roseman, Dir., Div. of Reserve Bank 
Operations and Payment Sys., Federal Reserve Board of Governors 14 (Nov. 20, 2010), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/amazon_comment_letter_20101120.pdf  
(showing that there is as much as a 98 basis point and two cents difference in CNP and CP 
interchange rates); see also Letter from Joshua R. Floum, Exec. Vice President, General Counsel 
and Secretary, Visa U.S.A., Inc., to Louise L Roseman, Dir., Div. of Reserve Bank Operations and 
Payment Sys., Federal Reserve Board of Governors 13 (Nov. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/visa_comment_letter20101118.pdf (noting that 
interchange rates reflect fraud risks). 
 86. See generally VISA, GLOBAL VISA CARD-NOT-PRESENT MERCHANT GUIDE TO GREATER 
FRAUD CONTROL: PROTECT YOUR BUSINESS AND YOUR CUSTOMERS WITH VISA’S LAYERS OF 
SECURITY, available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/global-visa-card-not-present-
merchant-guide-to-greater-fraud-control.pdf. 
 87. This code is variously called the Card Security Code (CSC), Card Verification Value 
(CVV or CV2 or CVV2), Card Verification Value Code (CVVC), Card Verification Code (CVC), 
Verification Code (V-Code or V Code), or Card Code Verification (CCV). The two included in 
some abbreviations is to distinguish it from the code on the front on the card and mag stripe (the 
card number). See Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, Data Breaches: What the Underground World of 
“Carding” Reveals, SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 375, 387 n. 66 (2009); see also 
Card Security Code (CSC) and Card Verification Value (CVV), BOOTSTRAP, 
http://mediakey.dk/~cc/card-security-code-csc-and-card-verification-value-cvv (last visited Oct. 
19, 2010). 
 88. See Mott, supra note 79. 
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address or other borrower information. Third, the issuer can use statistical 
fraud prevention tools called neural networks that can identify anomalies in 
spending behavior by analyzing transactions in relation to the cardholder’s 
transaction history, looking for outliers in geography, merchant type, and 
transaction amount. The speed of these networks allows issuers to prevent 
suspicious transactions at the authorization stage. 
Thus, if an 18-year old Peoria resident’s card was used at 5PM CDT to 
make a purchase at a fast food restaurant in Peoria, and then used at 5:15PM 
CDT to purchase a $2,000 dinner in Paris, there is likely a fraud occurring. 
The issuer can deny the questionable transaction and freeze the account 
until and unless the real cardholder contacts the issuer to unlock the account 
by providing some additional verification information.89 Critically, only the 
issuer has the ability to examine data from multiple transactions to observe 
transaction patterns; merchants only observe one-off transactions.   
Issuers’ ability to prevent unauthorized CNP transactions has advanced 
by leaps and bounds since the 1970s, when MOTO transactions began.90 
Moreover, issuers no longer need to be induced to authorize CNP 
transactions; e-commerce is so well established that issuers cannot and 
would not abandon the market if they were to bear liability for unauthorized 
transactions. 
The efficiency of CNP liability rules is suspect in light of changes in 
the marketplace. Originally, it made sense for merchants to bear the risk of 
fraud on CNP transactions because there was no effective avoidance and 
because merchants gained the greatest benefit from the transactions. Now 
issuers are the clear least cost avoider. Accordingly, placing the liability on 
issuers would be the efficient outcome; indeed, it would likely encourage 
greater security efforts, such as the use of two-factor identification methods 
that rely on factors other than CVV and billing address, such as a randomly 
generated PINs, which would be known only to the cardholder, absent 
cardholder carelessness.91 
C. MAKING SENSE OF THE LIABILITY RULES 
Payment card network rules for allocating liability for unauthorized 
transactions seem well-designed for card-present transactions, but are 
                                                                                                                 
 89. To be sure, the issuer’s ability to prevent fraud is far from perfect. Small ticket, local 
transactions are unlikely to get noticed. But compared to the merchant, the issuer has much greater 
ability to avoid the fraud. Yet, liability for CNP transactions is not on the issuer. 
 90. ANDERSON, supra note 79, at 394. 
 91. To be sure, we might ask whether their current situation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Why 
don’t merchants simply pay issuers for greater security measures up to the point where there 
would be no marginal benefit? The answer is because of a coordination problem due to high 
transactions—there are millions of merchants and thousands of issuers that must be coordinated—
and because of a free-riding problem. The benefits of improved issuer fraud prevention are shared 
by all merchants. If any merchant paid for better security, it would have to share the benefits with 
free-riders. Better, a merchant would calculate, to free-ride, than to be freely ridden. 
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unlikely to be optimal in a CNP setting. Figure 2 summarizes the variations 
between actual rules and the likely optimal rules, assuming that all 
authorization procedures are properly followed by the merchant. 
Figure 2. Actual and Likely Optimal Fraud Allocation Rules 
 EXISTING ACCOUNT 
FRAUD 
NEW ACCOUNT FRAUD 
ACTUAL 
RULE 
OPTIMAL 
RULE 
ACTUAL 
RULE 
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RULE 
CARD 
PRESENT ISSUER ISSUER ISSUER ISSUER 
CARD NOT 
PRESENT MERCHANT ISSUER MERCHANT ISSUER 
  
Why would the United States have suboptimal liability rules for 
payment card networks? Part of the answer is historical. As Part II.B. 
explained, for CNP transactions, rules that made sense in their original 
context have ossified and become outmoded by changes in technology. 
The history of the payment card networks themselves explains this 
ossification. Until 2005–2006, MasterCard and Visa, the largest payment 
card networks, were mutual organizations dominated by their large issuer 
banks.92 The large issuer banks had little incentive to change the CNP 
liability rules. Under the rules, issuers incur fraud losses that are only a 
fraction of merchants’.93 Thus in 2009, issuers incurred $0.95 billion in total 
(CP and CNP) fraud losses.94 In contrast, one study puts merchants’ total 
fraud losses at over $100 billion.95 While issuers are the least cost avoiders, 
they do not bear most of the costs of fraud. Therefore, they have little 
incentive to engage in aggressive anti-fraud efforts.96 For example, 
networks and issuers have persisted in using mag stripe cards with account 
numbers embossed on the front.97 These cards are extremely vulnerable to 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1327–28. 
 93. LEXISNEXIS FRAUD STUDY, supra note 1, at 23. 
 94. Kate Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 17. 
 95. LEXISNEXIS FRAUD STUDY, supra note 1, at 23. 
 96. In theory, in the credit card space, the other two networks, American Express and 
Discover, could have tried competitive differentiation based on different CNP fraud rules. 
However, these networks had little to gain from such differentiation. At best, it would increase 
their merchant acceptance rates, but it would not necessarily garner them more transactions, as 
merchants do not choose which card network a payment will be on. Moreover, these networks are 
also their own primary issuers (and were their sole issuers before 2005), so the competitive 
benefits from signing up more merchants would have to be weighed against the network-issuer 
incurring greater fraud losses. The calculus, apparently, weighed in favor of keeping the losses on 
merchants. For debit cards, CNP transactions have never been a critical issue because there are 
very few CNP debit transactions. MOTO and Internet debit transactions are rare. 
 97. See Mott, supra note 79. 
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skimming, to use when they are stolen, and to having account numbers 
simply copied down and then used in CNP transactions.98 Simple steps such 
as adopting Chip & PIN technology (discussed in more detail in the next 
section) would frustrate skimming and theft, while card numbers need not 
be displayed on the card.99 
Anti-fraud efforts must be implemented by issuers, but the role of 
setting standards falls to the network association itself. The problem is that 
the network associations compete with each other for issuer membership. 
The networks make most of their revenue from per transaction fees.100 This 
means that they want to increase volume on their cards, which in turn 
means that they need to have more cards in circulation. In order to increase 
the number of cards, networks need to have more and larger issuers in their 
stables. Networks thus compete for issuers. 
If a network required greater anti-fraud measures from issuers, it would 
impose additional costs on issuers and therefore make itself less attractive 
to them. The full cost of anti-fraud would be borne by the issuer, but the 
benefits would accrue primarily to the merchant, and issuers have little 
interest in subsidizing merchants for the overall good of the network. 
Mandating additional anti-fraud measures can cost a network market share, 
while bringing the network itself no tangible benefit.   
D. INTERNATIONAL VARIATION IN LIABILITY RULES AND FRAUD 
ARBITRAGE 
1. International Variation 
There is significant international variation in payment card fraud 
liability allocation rules.101 The international variation suggests that private 
ordering does not always produce optimal results. It is possible that 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id.  
 99. The short-lived Revolution Card (purchased by Amex in 2010) did not have an account 
number visible on the front and required a PIN for all transactions. See What is RevolutionCard?, 
REVOLUTIONCARD, http://www.revolutioncard.com/what-is-revolutioncard.aspx (last visited Oct. 
9, 2010) 
RevolutionCards don’t display your name, signature or other personally identifying 
information on the card, offering you unparalleled security. So, even if you lose your 
card, no one knows it’s yours, and if they do find out, they can not use it without your 
PIN. RevolutionCards are PIN-based, and members can create their own unique 4-digit 
Card Authorization Code (CAC) that is entered as a PIN into the PIN-pads at merchants 
locations, and can be used for online shopping and phone-orders. Cardholders can also 
generate random One Time CAC numbers, so they never need to give out their primary 
CAC/PIN when they are using the card for online purchases, phone or other card-not-
present transactions. 
Id. 
 100. See DeGennaro, supra note 45, at 28. 
 101. See MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, §§ 3.9.1, at 11-1, 3.9.1(3), at 14-2 
(corresponding rules in the Canada and the South Asia, Middle East, and Africa regions). 
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different orderings are optimal in different countries, perhaps reflecting 
variations in market penetration by payment cards. Yet there are variations, 
even among very similarly developed economies with similar payment card 
market penetration and usage patterns. 
Such variation is evidence that private ordering might not always result 
in optimal liability rules. But it does not tell us which, if any, of the private 
orderings is optimal. There is reason to believe, however, that the private 
ordering in the United States is suboptimal compared with systems around 
the world. Financial institutions in virtually every developed economy 
outside of the United States have adopted integrated circuit (IC), or chip 
cards, as their standard.102 Chip cards contain a microchip in the card.103 
The microchip is, like any microchip, multifunctional,104 but among its 
chief purposes is that it allows a card reader that operates on the same 
standard, known as EMV (short for EuroPay-MasterCard-Visa), to verify 
the authenticity of the card. The chip is thus an anti-counterfeiting device. 
Australia, Canada, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, United Arab 
Emirates, and virtually all of Europe have adopted EMV technology.105 
Unlike the traditional mag stripe card, a chip card is quite difficult to 
counterfeit. 
The chip technology itself is only a protection against counterfeiting 
physical cards, including duplication of actual cards. The chip does not 
prevent unauthorized transactions if a card is stolen.106 In some countries 
and regions, such as Australia, Canada, and Europe, financial institutions 
have gone further to require Chip & PIN technology, where the IC card can 
only be used with a PIN.107 Thus in Europe, all new, upgraded, or replaced 
point-of-sale chip terminals must have a PIN pad.108 
The PIN provides two-factor identification (the first factor being 
possession of the card) where one factor is separate from the card (unlike 
CVV), and helps ensure not only that the card is genuine, but that it is being 
used by its authorized user.109 Thus, the Oliver Wyman Group reports that 
in 2008 fraud loss rates on signature debit cards in the United States were 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See John Hill & Victoria Conroy, EMV: The Story So Far, CARDS INT’L, Apr. 2009, 
http://www.vrl-financial-news.com/asia-pacific/banking--payments-asia/issues/bpa-2009/bpa-
2009/emv-the-story-so-far.aspx; Thad Rueter, U.S. Stays on Sidelines As Other Nations Make 
EMV Game Plans, CARDS & PAYMENTS, Nov. 2009, at 14, 16. 
 103. See Mott, supra note 79 (“Payment Cards ‘Smart’”). 
 104. Id. (“Is Contactless the New Hope?”). 
 105. Hill & Conroy, supra note 102; Rueter, supra note 102. 
 106. See Hill & Conroy, supra note 102. 
 107. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 12-3.9.1(3), at 12-15. 
 108. Id. (discussing PIN Entry Device Mandate for the European Region). In Europe, issuers 
are also forbidden from authorizing CNP transactions unless there is CVC2 verification. Id. § 
3.9.2, at 12-15 (“CVC Processing for Card-Not-Present Transactions”). 
 109. Claes Bell, Are Chip and PIN Credit Cards Coming?, BANKRATE.COM (Feb. 2, 2010), 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/credit-cards/are-chip-and-pin-credit-cards-coming-1.aspx. 
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7.5 basis points, whereas PIN debit fraud loss rates were only one basis 
point.110 Although Chip & PIN is not a failsafe technology, it is a far 
stronger safety measure than anything on the American market.111 
In the United States, only two cards have been rolled out with a chip: 
the American Express Blue Card (Blue), first introduced in 1999,112 and the 
United Nations Federal Credit Union (UNFCU) Visa card, introduced in 
2010.113 Blue is American Express’s non-exclusive, mass-market card.114 
Blue enables Amex to charge its premium merchant discount fee rates for 
non-premium cardholders. While Amex equipped Blue cards with a chip, 
the chip is useless as a security measure as almost no American merchants 
have chip readers.115 Instead of serving as a security measure, the chip is 
used for storing information about rewards programs. 
The UNFCU Visa card, in contrast, does use Chip & PIN for security 
reasons.116 UNFCU moved to Chip & PIN technology both because it 
experienced particularly high fraud rates and because many of its members 
use their cards outside of the United States in countries where Chip & PIN 
is the norm and plain mag stripe cards are sometimes refused.117 In the 
United States, though, the UNFCU Visa card operates just as a regular mag 
stripe card, and it gains no security benefits from its Chip & PIN capability 
due to the lack of Chip & PIN enabled point-of-sale terminals.118 
Card network rules provide that use of Chip and Chip & PIN 
technologies has been coupled with a shift in liability for card-present 
transactions. Under the liability shift, merchants become, by default, liable 
for all unauthorized card-present transactions.119 But, if the transaction used 
a Chip reader, then the merchant will not be liable for losses from 
counterfeit cards; instead liability will shift back to the issuer.120 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Stephanie Bell, Study: Debit Fraud Rates Rose Sharply Last Year, AM. BANKER, May 21, 
2010, at 6. 
 111. Stephen J. Murdoch et al., EMV PIN Verification “Wedge” Vulnerability, UNIV. OF 
CAMBRIDGE, http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/banking/nopin (last visited Dec. 30, 
2010); see also Ross Anderson et al., Chip and Spin (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://chipandspin.co.uk/spin.pdf; Saar Drimer et al., Optimised to Fail: Card Readers 
for Online Banking 8–12 (Feb. 26–29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/fc09optimised.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). 
 112. Jennifer Kingson, A Credit Card Loses Its High-Tech Cred, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Dec. 
5, 2008, 11:30 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/05/a-credit-card-loses-its-high-tech-
cred. 
 113. David Morrison, United Nations FCU Becomes First Chip and PIN Card Issuer in the 
U.S., CREDIT UNION TIMES (May 26, 2010), http://www.cutimes.com/Issues/2010/May-26-
2010/Pages/United-Nations-FCU-Becomes-First-Chip-and-PIN-Card-Issuer-in-the-US.aspx. 
 114. Query, is “Blue” short for blue collar? 
 115. Morrison, supra note 113. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 55, § 2.8.2. 
 120. Id. 
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if the transaction is with a Chip & PIN card and is properly used with an 
EMV reader, then liability for unauthorized transactions shifts back to the 
issuer.121 
These liability-shifting rules are consciously designed to encourage 
merchant adoption of EMV readers. Some card networks have also 
encouraged this shift by imposing an “incentive interchange rate”—
interchange penalties and rewards. In some regions, MasterCard offers a ten 
basis point reduction in interchange for Chip & PIN transactions, and 
imposes a ten basis point penalty for non-Chip & PIN card-present 
transactions.122 
At least for MasterCard, the decision of whether to implement a Chip 
liability shift is left up to the financial institution members of the network—
not the merchants who are also affected. MasterCard permits a Chip 
liability shift program in any country or region in which MasterCard 
member financial institutions representing “75 percent of the currency 
volume of both acquiring and issuing transactions” approve.123 Thus, 
Europe has had a Chip liability shift since January 1, 2005, Brazil since 
March 1, 2008, Columbia since October 1, 2008, and Venezuela since July 
1, 2009. In Canada, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East the shift took effect 
on October 15, 2010.124 Intraregionally, Europe, Latin America, and the 
Caribbean have had Chip liability shifts since 2005.125  
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id.; VISA DISPUTE PROCEDURES, supra note 68, at 102 (noting that a chargeback is invalid 
“if the Device is EMV PIN-Compliant and the Transaction was correctly processed to completion 
in accordance with EMV and VIS using the Chip Card data”). 
For purposes of these Rules, “EMV-compliant” means in compliance with the EMV 
standards then in effect. 
1. Chip Liability Shift. The liability for intraregional counterfeit fraudulent Transactions in 
which one Regional Member (either the Issuer or the Acquirer) is not yet EMV-compliant 
is borne by the non–EMV-compliant Regional Member. 
 
2. Chip/PIN Liability Shift. The liability for intraregional lost, stolen, and never received 
fraudulent Transactions in which one Regional Member (either the Issuer or the Acquirer) 
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MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 3.9.1, at 12-14. 
 122. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 3.9.1(2), at 10-2 (applicable to the Asia & Pacific 
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3.9.1(2), at 14-2 (applicable to the South Asia, Middle East and Africa Regions). This implies that 
MasterCard believes that in these regions, the total costs of fraud borne by merchants plus the cost 
of investing in Chip & PIN readers is less than twenty basis points. 
 123. MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 55, §2.8.2.4.1.1, at 2-54. 
 124. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 3.9.1, at 11-1 (corresponding to the Canada 
Region); id. § 3.9.1(3), at 14-2, 14-3 (corresponding to the South Asia, Middle East, and Africa, 
regions). 
 125. MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, CIRRUS WORLDWIDE OPERATING RULES, § 11.1.1 (Sept. 15, 
2010). As MasterCard notes: 
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The absence of Chip & PIN technology in the United States bears 
comment. It is widely recognized that Chip & PIN technology significantly 
reduces fraud losses.126 In the UK, losses on fraud in face-to-face (card-
present) transactions fell from £135.9 in 2005 to £72.1M in 2009.127 So why 
hasn’t Chip & PIN been adopted in the United States? 
An initial answer may be that it is simply not efficient from a system-
wide perspective. While readily comparable international fraud loss rate 
data is not available, the United States was historically reputed to have 
relatively low fraud loss rates, in part due to low cost telecommunications 
that made real-time authorization possible.128 Moreover, total fraud losses 
on payment cards are noticeably lower than on competing payment 
methods, such as checks.129 If payment card fraud costs are sufficiently low, 
then there may simply not be an economic case for adopting Chip & PIN. 
On the other hand, a recent study estimates that U.S. payment card fraud 
losses rates are higher in the U.S. than in Australia, France, Spain, and the 
UK.130 
It is not clear, however, whether Chip & PIN would be an inefficient 
overinvestment in fraud prevention technology. Another explanation is that 
Chip & PIN implementation is actually an efficient investment, but it is 
stymied by the organization of and conflicts of interest in payment card 
networks, which fail to properly incentivize parties to take optimal care in 
preventing fraud. 
                                                                                                                 
EMV chip technology can provide a more secure alternative to non-chip technology for 
reducing fraudulent Transactions. Therefore, certain countries and Regions have 
decided to migrate to the EMV chip platform. 
Many of these same countries and Regions have instituted a chip liability shift program 
for domestic and intraregional Transactions to protect Members that have made the 
early investment in EMV chip. 
. . .  
Chip liability shift means that when a counterfeit fraud Transaction occurs in a country 
or Region that has migrated to the Chip platform the liability for the Transactions will 
shift to the non-chip-compliant party. 
Id. 
 126. See Rueter, supra note 102. 
 127. Facts and Figures, UK CARDS ASS’N, http://www.theukcardsassociation.org.uk/view_po 
int_and_publications/facts_and_figures (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). 
 128. See Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards, supra note 8, at 1069–70, 1090–91 (noting the 
role of telecommunications costs in determining payment card fraud resistance). 
 129.  Chris Costanzo, Combating Fraud, BANK DIRECTOR MAG., Q1 2007, 
http://www.bankdirector.com/issues/articles.pl?article_id=11865. It is unclear if fraud loss rates 
are lower for checks currently; historically they were. See William Roberds, The Impact of Fraud 
on New Methods of Retail Payment, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., 2Q 1998, at 
42, 45, available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/Roberd.pdf (noting a 2 basis point 
loss rate for checks compared with 18 basis point loss for credit cards in 1995).  
 130. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 110, 112–14.  
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Merchants have no ability to adopt Chip & PIN; they are not part of 
card networks and cannot change card network rules. Moreover, there is 
little reason for them to invest in Chip & PIN enabled point-of-sale 
terminals unless issuers are issuing Chip & PIN Cards. As acquirers pass 
fraud costs through to merchants, they have little interest in the matter. 
Only issuers have a direct interest and are part of card networks. Issuers, 
however, do not want to incur the cost of having to reissue cards to make 
them Chip & PIN capable. The counterfeiting losses in the United States do 
not justify the reissuance expense of issuers, and for debit cards, issuers do 
not want to see transactions shift from signature debit cards (which have 
higher interchange rates) to PIN debit cards.131 Card network organization 
structure and economics frustrate the adoption of the best technology for 
fraud prevention. 
2. Fraud Arbitrage 
International variation in fraud liability and security rules creates 
opportunities for fraud arbitrage, thereby undermining security systems. 
Fraudsters, often highly organized, use cards from more secure locations in 
less secure ones.132 
In particular, the lack of Chip & PIN protection in the United States 
undermines Chip & PIN systems abroad.133 For example, Canada has 
adopted Chip & PIN technology, but Canadian credit cards can be used to 
pay in the United States.134 When a Canadian card is used in the United 
States, it is used without a Chip & PIN because almost no American 
merchants have Chip & PIN capable readers.135 Canadian fraudsters know 
that they merely have to use stolen Canadian card numbers in the United 
States. Furthermore, Canadian consumers and merchants might be less 
vigilant about protecting their physical cards because of the lulling effect of 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Kate Fitzgerald, Calculating the Cost: Debit Fees Could be Cut by $5B, AM. BANKER, 
June 28, 2010, at 1 (noting higher interchange rates on signature debit cards than on PIN debit 
cards). This shift may happen regardless because of the Durbin Interchange Amendment. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075, 
124 Stat. 1376, 2068–74 (2010). 
 132. See Rueter, supra note 105, at 14, 17. 
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PIN security). 
 134. See Rueter, supra note 102. 
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actually use the terminals for Chip & PIN transactions when presented with a Chip & PIN card. 
See Kate Fitzgerald, Wal-Mart Claims Issuers Block Progress of EMV Cards in U.S., AM. 
BANKER, May 24, 2010, at 7. 
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two-factor Chip & PIN identification; Canadian consumers believe that the 
card by itself is useless without the PIN—and it is—but not when the card 
is used south of the border. 
Another variation of this international fraud arbitrage problem is the use 
of European cards in the United States. The Chip & PIN arbitrage also 
exists between Europe and the United States, but there is another variation 
in security as well.136 In the United States, real time authorization is the key 
line of fraud prevention.137 Because of historically high telecommunications 
costs, however, Europe does not use real time authorization systems.138 
Instead, European anti-fraud efforts were channeled into better security 
features in the cards and the terminals—Chip & PIN.139 When European 
cards are used in the United States, the worst of both worlds exists. The 
superior card and terminal security features are not functional, and there is 
no real time authorization. 
III. REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS 
A. THE COORDINATION PROBLEM IN PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS 
The problems of international fraud arbitrage speak to the core 
coordination issue in payment systems. Payment systems are the backbone 
of the economy; they are the infrastructure of commerce. Payment systems 
allow commerce to move beyond barter by creating a common liquid 
medium for exchanging value. Liquidity requires standardization. 
Standardization is the lubricant of exchange, and every successful payment 
medium has been standardized to a greater or lesser degree: wampum, cell 
phone minutes, gold, or electronic payment commands.  
Standardization includes standardized security measures. The security 
measures (or lack thereof) of individual participants in a payment system 
may have positive or negative externalities on other system participants. A 
participant’s strong security measures can help deter fraud generally and 
catch fraudsters as well as frustrate attempts to obtain data that can be used 
to defraud other system participants. Similarly, lax security measures (such 
as poor data security) can result in fraud losses at other system participants. 
Payment system participants do not internalize these costs or benefits, 
however, so left to their own devices, they may not achieve the optimal 
level of security.140 Mandatory coordination among system participants is 
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critical, then, for optimizing security measures and promoting positive 
externalities.  
Accordingly, participation in various payment systems is dependent 
upon abiding by system standards. These standards are sometimes indirect 
and mandatory by public law, such as bank safety and soundness 
requirements like Know Your Customer rules. Other times, they are private 
law that operate through contract, such as membership in a payment card 
network or a check clearinghouse or automated clearinghouse.  
Standardization requires a standard setting process. One of the major 
roles of payment card networks is standard setting. For multi-institution 
networks, this is a tremendous coordination task. International fraud 
arbitrage shows that in a global economy, international standards are 
needed for data security.141 It is insufficient for standards to be nationally 
based. If electronic payments are to be global currency, they need uniform 
security standards. 
Setting standards in payment card networks involves coordinating 
between multiple parties.142 For multi-issuer networks, such as MasterCard, 
Visa, and all the PIN debit networks, it is necessary to coordinate between 
numerous issuers and acquirers. This often involves the network acting 
unilaterally; the transaction costs of individual issuer-acquirer negotiations 
for networks that can involve 16,000143 financial institutions are simply too 
great. Similarly, merchants’ dealings with the networks via their acquirer 
banks cannot readily be individually negotiated; there would need to be too 
many negotiations. Coasean bargaining is not possible given the transaction 
costs in multi-party networks. 
Given the impracticality of Coasean bargaining with payment systems, 
how can we hope to optimize outcomes? The answer lies in highlighting 
both cooperative and competitive features of payment card networks. 
Payment card networks represent an unusual confluence of competition and 
cooperation, or as David Evans and Richard Schmalensee have termed it, 
“co-opetition.”144 Improving fraud loss liability allocations involves two 
seemingly contradictory moves, each of which playing to a different aspect 
of co-opetition. First, coordination problems can be smoothed over by 
encouraging greater security coordination between card networks (and their 
participants). Second, antitrust enforcement on the long-simmering 
interchange issue—which has been only partially resolved by the Durbin 
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Interchange Amendment145 and the antitrust litigation brought by the 
Department of Justice and seven states against MasterCard, Visa, and 
American Express146—will ensure that there is true price competition in the 
payment card market between networks and merchants. As fraud liability is 
a component of price, enabling price competition will help achieve a result 
closer to that of Coasean bargaining. In the presence of overwhelming 
transaction costs, strong competition can substitute for Coasean bargaining. 
B. ENCOURAGE BETTER GOVERNANCE FOR SECURITY STANDARD 
COORDINATION 
Payment card security measures are largely undertaken at the network 
level;147 the network mandates particular practices, and issuers and 
acquirers must comply.148 Despite most security measures being mandated 
on the network level, networks do not compete on security measures for 
end-users. Merchants, who bear the bulk of fraud losses, are indifferent to 
variations in networks’ security measures. Most merchants accept cards 
from multiple networks, and to the extent that they do not accept particular 
networks’ cards, it is usually because of interchange fees, not security rule 
variations. Merchants typically get bundled acquiring (or at least 
processing) services; the acquirer or processor will handle all of the 
merchant’s payment card transactions using the same interface.149 Thus, 
from the merchant’s perspective there is no difference between card 
networks except pricing; security distinctions are invisible to the merchants. 
Similarly, consumers are utterly indifferent to network-level security 
mandates. The federal consumer liability limitation for unauthorized 
payment card transactions and the networks’ zero liability policies for 
unauthorized transactions reduce consumers’ incentive to care about card 
security measures.150 Consumers have no contractual privity with the 
network and see no difference in card functionality between networks. A 
MasterCard and a Visa credit card are completely interchangeable from a 
consumer’s perspective, and issuers will sometimes switch consumer’s 
accounts among networks. Likewise, the same debit card is often an access 
device for multiple debit card networks: Accel, Cirrus, Interlink, NYCE, 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068–74 (2010). 
 146. See Complaint, United States v. Am. Exp., Co., No. 1:10-cv-04496 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 4, 
2010) (alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act based on various card 
network merchant restraint rules); [Proposed] Final Judgment, United States v. Am. Exp., Co., No. 
1:10-cv-04496 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 4, 2010). 
 147. Douglass, supra note 9, at 45. 
 148. See id.; Ballen & Fox, supra note 9, at 940–41. 
 149. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 144, at 6–7. 
 150. Note, however, that not all debit card networks have zero liability policies. Given the low 
rate of PIN debit fraud and the existing Regulation E limitations on consumer liability, such a zero 
liability policy would not mean much to consumers.  
2010] Private Disordering? 33 
Plus, Pulse, Star, etc.151 Consumers never select what networks will have 
preferred routing flags on their debit cards; that choice is left to their banks.  
While most security features are mandated by the networks, there is 
variation among issuers in security features and practices. In particular, 
issuers’ fraud detection relies heavily on neural networks, but individual 
issuers have their own neural network designs. Consumers have little reason 
to care about variations in issuer anti-fraud measures, as they are almost 
never themselves liable, and, perhaps more importantly, they cannot gauge 
the value of anti-fraud technologies. There is no way for a consumer to 
know whether a particular issuer’s technology is better than another’s. 
Fraud protection is not like a burglar alarm. There are a limited number of 
ways into a dwelling, and a consumer can, in theory, test an alarm system 
against simulated burglary. The same cannot be done for card fraud. 
Because payment card end-users are indifferent to variations in 
networks’ anti-fraud measures, there is little reason to foster competition 
among networks on security measures. Bundled merchant services and 
consumer indifference mean that networks have little incentive to compete 
in terms of security measures. Indeed, because the costs of security 
measures are borne by issuers, while most of the benefits accrue to 
merchants, issuers are resistant to greater security measures. A network that 
unilaterally imposes more demanding and costly security measures risks 
losing issuer business to other networks. 
Given that the market is structured against competition for heightened 
security measures, how can we encourage greater security measures in 
payment card networks? One way is to encourage coordination among 
networks. If networks could coordinate security measures, they could adopt 
them uniformly, thereby eliminating market pressure from issuers for lower 
security measures. Security measures are an area where we might actually 
want some type of standard setting. (And, to the extent that we view 
security standards as a form of price, price-fixing!) 
Network coordination should be guided by the principle of locating 
what method would benefit the overall payment card industry—that is, a net 
social welfare gain—rather than what would increase the size of any 
particular network—that is, a gain to any particular competitor. 
Coordination on security measures would essentially liberate the networks 
to engage in more effective allocation of that portion of price among 
network participants. 
The card networks have already devised a corporatist form of 
coordination using the Payment Card Industry Security Standards 
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Council.152 PCI SSC is a nominally independent organization created by the 
card networks to promulgate non-binding data security standards for 
payment cards.153 PCI SSC is owned by the five major credit card networks 
(American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB International (Japan 
Commerce Bank), MasterCard WorldWide, and Visa, Inc.).154 Each 
network appoints an officer to the PSC SSC executive committee and 
management committee. PCI SSC has 612 “participating organizations,” 
including financial institutions and intermediaries of various sorts, trade 
associations, and merchants ranging from Wal-Mart to the University of 
Notre Dame.155 Participating organizations get to nominate and vote for the 
PCI SSC’s twenty-member Board of Advisors (which currently only has 
four representatives from entities classified as “merchants”) and to review 
proposed PCI standards and revisions thereto, including the Payments Card 
Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS), before they are made public. 
Neither participating organization nor the Board of Advisors has any formal 
ability to determine the standards.156 While PCI SSC cannot itself enforce 
the PCI DSS because it does not have a contractual relationship with card 
network participants, all of the networks incorporate the PCI DSS in their 
rules, and require network participants to be PCI DSS compliant.157  
To date, the operation of the PCI SSC has been controversial.158 
Networks and issuers play a leading role in PCI SSC, and merchant groups 
complain that PCI DSS is geared toward advancing issuers’ interests.159 In 
particular, merchant groups object to PCI SSC data retention requirements, 
which issuers want because of chargeback issues.160 PCI SSC requires 
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merchants to retain certain transaction data.161 While the data is supposed to 
be encrypted and otherwise protected, merchants object that the mere 
presence of large volumes of transaction data make them tempting targets 
for fraudsters.162 
Moreover, the effectiveness of the PCI DSS is unclear. Heartland 
Payment Systems, Inc., a major card processor, was subjected to hacking 
from December 2007 until October 2008, during which time 130 million 
records were stolen.163 Heartland was certified as PCI DSS compliant in 
April 2008.164 Visa disputes Heartland’s PCI DSS compliance.165 In 2009, a 
data security breach occurred at Network Solutions, which had also been 
certified as PCI DSS compliant.166  
These incidents raise the question of what benefit there is to payment 
card network participants of becoming PCI DSS compliant. PCI DSS 
compliance is extremely expensive, but might not ultimately protect them 
from data breaches and liability for the expenses caused by the breach, 
including reissuance of cards.167 
As a concept, inter-network security coordination for payment systems 
makes sense. The PCI SCC is designed to facilitate coordination between 
competing payment card networks. This is an important goal, with 
potentially precompetitive effects through positive security externalities. 
Nevertheless, the PCI SCC’s structure raises serious antitrust concerns. In 
execution, PCI DSS might be skewed by the dynamics of payment card 
network economics as well, and reflect the interest of issuers—the most 
price elastic type of network participant—rather than the overall interests of 
all network participants. In other words, the structure of the PCI SCC raises 
concerns that PCI DSS is being used to bolster the pre-existing problems in 
the payment card interchange fee system. 
Given the significant benefits that can come from data security standard 
setting, standard-setting processes should be encouraged. But it is also 
important that they be fair. Standard setting needs to be a tool to further 
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competition, not to squelch it. This suggests two seemingly contradictory 
regulatory interventions: encouragement of inter-network coordination for 
data security setting and more vigorous antitrust enforcement. Standard 
setting should be encouraged, but only with a more adequately 
representative and fair governance structure that provides a balance of 
interest and due process.  
The precise mechanics of a reformed payment system security standard 
setting are beyond the scope of this Article, but given the critical 
infrastructure utility role that payment card networks play in commercial 
transactions and the law enforcement resources involved, some level of 
government involvement to ensure that standards are set through a fair 
process that produces socially optimal outcomes is appropriate.168 Already, 
the Durbin Interchange Amendment provides for the Federal Reserve to 
consider fraud prevention costs and technology in its rule-making regarding 
debit card interchange fees.169  
Government involvement in payment card data security need not mean 
government setting of security standards. Instead, the involvement could be 
limited to government supervision of process. Because of its lack of formal 
procedural requirements, the PCI DSS standard setting process should be 
relatively nimble, but this comes at the expense of due process and adequate 
representation of all constituencies involved in payment card transactions, 
including merchants, consumers, and law enforcement. Payment card data 
security needs coordination between ostensible competitors, but if such 
coordination is to be permitted, it must be through a process that does not 
allow competing networks to leverage security standard setting to further 
their own economic interests at the expense of optimal security standards. 
C. MORE VIGOROUS PAYMENTS ANTITRUST POLICY 
The other concurrent approach that should be pursued is to improve 
inter-network competition for merchants’ business. As the situation 
currently stands, networks compete with each other primarily for issuers, 
not for merchants. The goal of networks is to increase network transaction 
volume, and that requires getting as many of their cards in circulation as 
possible. Maximizing cards in circulation requires vigorous recruiting of 
issuers. 
Once a network signs up issuers, it will get its cards out to consumers, 
and once a consumer presents the network’s card at a merchant, the network 
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has a monopoly on processing the transaction. This means that the networks 
do not have to court merchants as assiduously as they do issuers. To be 
sure, a merchant can opt-out of accepting a particular network’s cards, and 
some do, particularly for American Express;170 but as long as the credit and 
signature networks all price fairly similarly for credit, signature debit, and 
PIN debit, respectively, there is no reason for a merchant to take one 
network brand and not another. Moreover, the complexity of interchange 
rates makes it difficult for merchants to even determine what relative 
pricing is between networks, as pricing depends on the type of card and the 
level of rewards, as well as the merchant’s industry.171 Because card 
network competition has focused on competition for issuers, rather than 
both issuers and merchants, the cost of payment card acceptance, including 
fraud liability, is structured to favor issuers. 
The Durbin Interchange Amendment will change this situation by 
creating more competition for merchant business—but only for debit cards 
and small dollar credit card transactions. The Durbin Amendment requires 
that debit card interchange fees be “reasonable and proportional to the cost 
incurred by the issuer,” meaning the incremental cost of a transaction, with 
an issuer-specific adjustment for fraud prevention costs, as determined by 
the Federal Reserve.172 This provision could result in debit interchange 
pricing that strongly encourages the use of PIN or Chip & PIN technology; 
regulatory intervention might accomplish the optimal end that private-
ordering has failed to do. It will take the outcome of the Federal Reserve’s 
rule-making, to be finalized in early 2011,173 before the ultimate effect is 
clear. 
The Durbin Amendment also permits merchants to offer discounts 
(including in-kind discounts) to incentivize consumer use of particular 
payment systems;174 and, critically, the Durbin Amendment forbids network 
exclusivity on debit cards and lets merchants choose the routing of debit 
transactions.175 Thus, debit cards will be capable of “multi-homing”—
clearing over multiple networks,176 and merchants, rather than issuers, will 
decide which networks. The result should be that networks have to compete 
more for merchant routing decisions, which means lowering costs, be it 
direct pecuniary costs like interchange fees or indirect costs like fraud 
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liability. The Durbin Amendment is likely to affect not just debit cards, but 
also credit cards to the extent that credit competes with debit for small 
ticket transactions. 
The Durbin Amendment is not a complete solution to the competition 
problems in the payment systems marketplace, but it opens the door to a 
rationalization of the fraud liability rules for merchants and issuers. 
IV. LIMITATIONS OF CONSUMER LIABILITY: A DEFENSE 
A. CONSUMER LIABILITY RULES FOR UNAUTHORIZED PAYMENT 
CARD TRANSACTIONS 
The most major federal intervention in payment system loss allocation 
is the limitation by federal law of consumer liability for unauthorized 
transactions.177 Consumer liability for unauthorized credit card transactions 
is limited to $50, and the consumer has no liability once the consumer has 
notified the card issuer about the loss, theft, or possible unauthorized use of 
the card.178 The burden of proof to show that the use was authorized is on 
the card issuer.179 
For debit cards, consumer liability is generally limited to $50,180 but it 
increases to a maximum of $500 if the consumer does not notify the issuer 
within two business days of learning of the loss or theft of the card, and the 
card issuer establishes that the transactions would not have occurred had 
there been timely notice.181 In addition, if the consumer does not report an 
unauthorized transaction that appears on a periodic account statement 
within sixty days of the transmittal of the statement, then the consumer 
incurs unlimited liability for all unauthorized transactions that occur 
between the end of those sixty days and notice to the issuer, provided that 
the issuer can show that the transactions would not have occurred had there 
been timely notice.182 These time limits can be extended for extenuating 
circumstances, such as extended travel or hospitalization.183 Again, in all 
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cases, the burden of proof to show that a transaction was in fact authorized 
is on the card issuer.184 
These rules apply to all unauthorized usage, not just fraud, which is the 
focus of this Article. The federal liability rules thus create something close 
to a strict liability regime for credit card fraud and a strict liability scheme 
with an exception for contributory negligence for debit cards.185 It is worth 
noting that liability for unauthorized payment card transactions contrasts 
with checks, where there is no consumer liability for unauthorized 
transactions (meaning orders of payment) whatsoever, absent consumer 
negligence that “substantially contributes” to the fraud.186 Whereas the 
checking system has a true contributory negligence scheme, credit cards are 
strict liability, and debit cards are strict liability with contributory 
negligence regarding the amount, but not the fact, of the loss.   
B. THE CASE AGAINST MANDATORY LIABILITY RULES 
Epstein and Brown contend that consumer liability for unauthorized 
transactions should not be capped by statute, as they “see no reason even 
for this (modest) restriction on freedom of contract. If payment card 
companies think larger penalties are appropriate and disclose such penalties 
to consumers, the losses should not be socialized as a matter of law.”187 
While Epstein and Brown’s major complaint about the mandatory 
liability caps is that it could frustrate more efficient private bargaining over 
liability, that is not the only problem with the mandatory liability rules for 
unauthorized transactions. The mandatory liability rules also create a moral 
hazard and effectuate a wealth redistribution from consumers who engage 
in low-risk behavior to consumers who engage in high-risk behavior. The 
limitation on consumer liability, in most cases to $50 (which is not inflation 
indexed), provides little pecuniary incentive for consumers to take care in 
their transactions and with their cards. Moreover, given the difficulties in 
proving first-party fraud, with the burden of showing unauthorized 
transactions resting on the card issuer, the liability limitation creates a very 
real moral hazard of first-party fraud.   
In addition, the liability rules create a perverse redistribution that 
rewards high-risk behavior. Low-risk consumers might prefer to incur more 
potential liability in exchange for savings on other payment card price 
terms. By being pooled with high-risk consumers under the same 
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mandatory liability rules, the low-risk consumers are being forced to forgo 
these potential savings for the benefit of high-risk consumers. The result is 
to penalize precisely those consumers whose behavior should be 
encouraged. In such circumstances, a rational consumer will be incentivized 
to engage in higher-risk behavior in order to be a recipient, rather than the 
payee of the subsidy. 
Notably, MasterCard188 and Visa189 both have so-called “zero liability” 
policies that reduce consumer liability in many cases beneath the federal 
liability cap.190 These caps essentially install a negligence regime for 
liability up to $50, after which the federal strict liability regimes take over. 
Epstein and Brown argue that the zero liability policies demonstrate that 
“[m]arket pressures have pushed the balance still further, insulating 
payment card users from essentially all fraud losses.”191 In other words, the 
federal law is an unnecessary (but fortunately harmless) intervention. 
Indeed, as Duncan Douglass has observed, the zero liability policy arguably 
creates a moral hazard, as consumers have little reason to take care to 
protect their cards and card data.192 
C. IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSUMER LIABILITY LIMITATIONS 
Despite the problems created by the mandatory liability caps, there is 
nevertheless a good case supporting them. Absent the mandatory caps, the 
zero liability policies might not obtain and adverse selection, 
disproportionate negotiation costs, information asymmetries, consumer 
hyperbolic discounting and optimism biases, the relative salience of 
different price points to consumers, and consumers’ limited ability to 
absorb losses relative to other payment card network participants all 
militate for capping consumer liability. 
1. Counterfactual Consideration  
Epstein and Brown’s reading of the impact of the zero liability policy is 
reasonable, but it is hardly the only fair interpretation. First, it is worth 
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considering a counterfactual scenario. What would the world look like 
without the federal $50 liability limitation on credit cards? Would Visa and 
MasterCard have adopted zero liability policies? Maybe. The zero liability 
policy was only adopted in 2000,193 which indicates that it might have been 
a move to encourage e-commerce. 
But it might also be that once consumer liability is limited to $50, the 
marketing benefits to the network of going from $50 liability to zero 
liability for nonnegligent consumers outweigh the fraud losses. Given the 
costs of pursuing the last $50 of liability, issuers really do not give up 
anything by going to zero liability, and they gain a significant marketing 
benefit. The zero liability policies are advertised in a way that implies that 
they are strict liability regimes, with the fact that they are highly 
discretionary negligence regimes hidden in vaguely worded fine print. 
Thus, consumers might well assume that they have less liability than they 
do under the zero liability policies. Moreover, the cost of disputing up to 
$50 with consumers might simply not be worthwhile for issuers.  
The real question is whether networks would adopt zero liability 
policies if by statute consumers were liable for $100 or $500 or $1,000? We 
don’t know, but it cautions against assuming that the $50 liability limit has 
been toothless or that zero liability would be the policy the networks would 
generally adopt.194  
2. Monetary Deductibles, Copayments, and Contributory 
Negligence 
The mandatory liability caps are part of a system that includes notable 
moral hazard mitigants. The federal consumer liability limitations are a type 
of strict liability regime for card fraud. As Samuel Rea has noted, “[s]trict 
liability without contributory negligence is essentially mandatory 
insurance.”195 A standard insurance move to reduce moral hazard is to 
require deductibles and copayments. The $50 liability cap on credit cards 
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can thus be seen as equivalent to a $50 deductible on a mandatory federal 
insurance policy.196 
For debit cards, federal law creates a strict liability regime with a 
peculiar kind of contributory negligence. The contributory negligence under 
the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and Reg E is only for losses incurred 
after the loss or theft of the card due to failure to promptly report the loss or 
theft; it does not apply to pre-loss or pre-theft behavior.197 In other words, 
the contributory negligence component of consumer liability for 
unauthorized debit card transactions only goes to the magnitude of the loss 
due to unauthorized use, not the actions that caused the loss in the first 
place. The result is that it does not incentivize consumers to take 
precautions to prevent loss or theft. This means that in terms of fraud losses, 
there is primarily a strict liability regime for debit cards too, and with a $50 
deductible. 
3. Non-Pecuniary Costs 
In addition to the monetary deductible, there can also be considerable 
non-pecuniary harms to consumers from unauthorized card usage. It is not 
merely “the major inconvenience of the disruption of service,”198 or having 
to get the charges reversed, but also things like having to monitor credit 
reports, close other accounts, etc.199 These additional, non-pecuniary costs 
are essentially copayments. Thus, built into the federal liability limitation 
are two standard responses to moral hazard problems—deductibles and 
copayments. 
4. Limited Consumer Ability to Prevent Fraud 
Imposing liability on consumers for unauthorized transactions makes 
little sense if that liability does not alter consumer behavior. Some 
unauthorized transactions are due to consumer negligence, but others are 
not. We lack an empirical sense of the role cardholder negligence plays in 
unauthorized transactions. Clearly there are numerous fraud possibilities 
even when a consumer acts responsibly. Consider a simple case where a 
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consumer is robbed and the card is used for a transaction by the thief before 
the consumer can report its loss. What justification is there for consumer 
liability then? More typically, card data is not stolen directly from the 
consumer, but from a merchant or a financial institution. Again, the 
justification for consumer liability is missing in such cases; the consumer 
has no ability to control merchant or financial institution data security 
measures. 
Instead, the case for consumer liability seems limited to situations in 
which a consumer fails to take reasonable care of his or her physical card, 
such as writing a PIN number on a debit card and then leaving a debit card 
in a location where it could be pilfered by a domestic employee. It seems 
unlikely that such situations account for a significant portion of payment 
card fraud. 
Consider, then, an intermediate situation, in which the cardholder 
leaves his card out long enough for someone to copy down the card digits. 
Should the cardholder be liable in such a situation? Or should the liability 
be better placed on the card issuer that issued an account access device that 
is so easily compromised?  
5. Consumer Knowledge of Liability Rules and Concerns About 
Issuer Compliance  
In addition, as Professor Ronald Mann has noted, consumers may not 
know of the liability limitation.200 It is doubtful, for example, that most 
consumers are aware of the contributory negligence rules for debit card 
liability. Similarly, Mann notes that even informed consumers might doubt 
whether financial institutions would comply with the law.201 If a financial 
institution does not comply with the liability rules in the case of a debit 
transaction, the consumer simply loses his or her money. In the case of a 
credit transaction, the consumer might be able to avoid the monetary loss, 
but risks the loss of a credit line, a damaged credit report, and debt 
collection harassment. While the consumer could litigate the issue, in many 
cases, the cost of litigating would vastly outweigh the harm to the 
consumer.202 
When consumers are unaware of the liability limitation, moral hazard 
simply will not exist, and if they are concerned about legal compliance, 
then moral hazard must be discounted. All of these factors—deductibles, 
copayments, contributory negligence, lack of knowledge about the law, and 
doubts about compliance with the law—suggest that moral hazard concerns 
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about the federal liability limitation are overblown, and that consumers 
have a reasonably strong incentive to protect their cards and card data. 
Finally, while the zero liability policy could create a moral hazard if the 
counterweights of deductibles and copayments were insufficient, that moral 
hazard must be weighed against the alternative. We have to consider the 
situation that would obtain in the absence of the zero liability policy or $50 
federal liability cap. What would consumer liability look like? Would it 
reflect a Coasean bargain between consumers and card issuer? It is hard to 
believe that it would because of the tremendous information asymmetries 
between card issuers and consumers.203 
6. Adverse Selection as Justification for Mandatory Liability 
Rules 
Information asymmetries raise the possibility of adverse selection 
problems, which are a standard justification for mandatory insurance 
regimes like the federal consumer liability limitations. (An analogous 
consumer liability situation is state law mandating nonrecourse 
mortgages.204) The problem of adverse selection arises because of a 
tendency of low-risk individuals to drop out of insurance pools when 
insurers cannot distinguish between high- and low-risk individuals.205 
Insurers must charge a blended price, which is too high for the low-risk 
individuals. The result is that insurance pools are then comprised of higher 
risk individuals, so insurers charge higher premiums, which further 
exacerbates the adverse selection by driving out the lower-risk individuals 
remaining in the pool. The result can be a socially suboptimal level of 
insurance. 
A standard response to adverse selection is to mandate insurance, so as 
to force both low-risk and high-risk individuals into the same risk pool.206 
In the case of payment card fraud, there is good reason to encourage 
mandatory insurance. There is a possibility of suboptimal insurance due to 
consumers’ difficulty in gauging both the likelihood and magnitude of 
payment card fraud loss because neither relates solely to their behavior. To 
the extent that consumers overestimate the risks, they may well opt-out of 
using payment cards altogether. Liability limitations are a market 
confidence building measure. 
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7. Contractual Frictions: Information Asymmetries, Bargaining 
Costs, Bundled Pricing, Hyperbolic Discounting, and Price 
Salience  
Adverse selection is driven by one set of information asymmetries—
that consumers know more about their own riskiness than card issuers. 
Another set of information asymmetries—that issuers know more about the 
terms of cardholder agreements than consumers—combines with 
asymmetric negotiation costs to create further frictions that impede efficient 
Coasean bargaining. As Professors Cooter and Rubin have noted: 
 
[T]he cost of negotiating the loss allocation provisions of a 
consumer deposit agreement typically exceeds the potential benefit. 
Shopping for alternative sets of fixed term contracts—a more 
realistic scenario than bargaining for specific terms—eliminates 
these negotiation costs, but replaces them with search costs. 
Moreover, asymmetric information limits the effectiveness of 
consumer shopping. Consumers are unlikely to think about the 
liability terms of a contract when opening an account, and those that 
do, find their curiosity rewarded with the incomprehensible 
legalisms of form contracts and statute books. Even if they knew 
what the terms meant, consumers generally would not know how to 
value differences in these terms.207 
 
A further reason to be skeptical that private bargaining would produce 
optimal consumer liability rules is that liability for unauthorized 
transactions is only one term among many in cardholder agreements.208 If 
one takes Epstein and Brown’s subscription to a Coasean universe 
seriously, this observation should be heartening. It should not matter what 
the fraud liability rule is because the parties can simply reallocate if that is 
efficient.209 Liability for unauthorized use is merely one component of 
payment card pricing. Thus, the federal liability cap does not restrict total 
pricing of payment cards. It only affects one way of expressing that price. 
Accordingly, parties can effectively reallocate the total price through other 
price components of payment cards. In the Coasean world, whether the 
price of using a payment card is allocated via liability rules or annual fees 
or interchange fees should not matter if there is the same level of 
competition on each and every price term. In other words, if Epstein and 
Brown are correct about the market, the federal liability cap does not create 
a troublesome distortion.   
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In reality, however, not all price terms for payment cards are equal and 
fully interchangeable. There is more vigorous competition on some price 
terms than others, in part due to their salience to consumers. When 
confronted with a multi-term contract, consumers may give undue emphasis 
to terms that are particularly salient either because of the manner in which 
the information is presented to the consumer or because of hyperbolic 
discounting of contingent events.210 This means that there is a discounting 
that occurs in the trade-off between price terms, so the reallocation of costs 
among price terms might not be neutral in terms of total cost. If payment 
card pricing is forced by regulation from less salient to more salient price 
terms, there will be more vigorous price competition, which will push down 
the total cost of using a payment card. 
This suggests that in the absence of regulation, a profit-maximizing 
firm will place as much of the price as possible on less salient terms and 
will max out on consumers’ price elasticity on less salient terms before 
letting pricing spill over to more salient terms. Regulation, then, does not 
necessarily result in a one-for-one substitution of price terms, but can result 
in an overall reduction in price (and profit margin). 
The contingent nature of liability for unauthorized card usage, as well 
as the potential absence of a clear monetary price term if either a consumer 
negligence standard or strict consumer liability were to apply, means that 
fraud liability is unlikely to be a salient term for consumers.211 In the 
context of these bundled contracts, there might not be optimal pricing of 
fraud terms, even if there were vigorous competition among issuers for 
consumers. Thus, the federal liability cap might actually have 
precompetitive effects by forcing payment card issuers to shift pricing away 
from a less salient term like liability for unauthorized use and to more 
salient price points like annual fees or interest rates.  
The federal statutory limitations on consumer liability may not be 
optimal (not least because the $50 deductible is not inflation indexed, so the 
real potential pecuniary liability is constantly decreasing), but it is far from 
clear that they result in an inferior outcome than private-ordering. The 
regulatory outcome may not be Kaldor-Hicks optimal, but it might increase 
consumer surplus by encouraging more vigorous price competition. 
8. Relative Ability to Bear Losses 
A final argument for the federal liability cap is distributional, or as 
Cooter and Rubin refer to it, the “loss spreading principle”.212 Once there 
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are losses in the system, they must be allocated somewhere, and placing 
losses on parties in accordance with their ability to absorb losses presents a 
potential principle for loss allocation. The loss spreading principle stands in 
some tension with a least cost avoider principle, as it is based on ability to 
absorb, rather than prevent, losses. 
Cooter and Rubin argue that risk should be assigned to the party that 
can achieve risk-neutrality—that is having equal valuation of a risk of a loss 
and the average value of that loss—at the lowest cost.213 As Cooter and 
Rubin explain, risk neutrality is dependent upon the relative size of the loss 
to a party’s assets and the party’s ability to spread the loss.214 Both factors 
point to financial institutions and merchants being able to achieve risk 
neutrality more cheaply than consumers. 
Because consumers’ resources are generally more limited than financial 
institutions’ or merchants’, consumers are less well suited to bear unlimited 
liability from the unauthorized use of a payment card than a financial 
institution or a merchant. Liability for $100,000 in unauthorized charges 
would be devastating to most households’ finances in a way that it would 
not be for a financial institution or certainly a large merchant. This makes 
consumers more risk averse than financial institutions or merchants.   
Consumers also have less ability to spread losses than financial 
institutions or merchants. For a consumer, the unauthorized use of a 
payment card is a fairly remote risk, but with potentially high costs. These 
costs will likely be borne entirely by the consumer; they cannot easily be 
passed on to other parties.215 For a financial institution or a merchant, fraud 
is a regular occurrence, and its costs can be amortized over a large base of 
transactions. Moreover, because financial institutions and merchants have 
superior information about their risks from payment card fraud relative to 
consumers, they are more likely to optimally insure against it.216 
Consumers’ more limited ability to absorb losses than other payment card 
network participants is an additional argument for limiting their liability by 
statute.  
CONCLUSION 
Payment card networks, if left to their own devices, are as likely to 
produce private disorder, as efficient private order. Regulatory attention has 
focused on the explicit price points in payments—interchange fees—but the 
latent price point of fraud liability allocation is equally important. 
Optimizing fraud liability allocation necessitates recognition of the co-
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optetive nature of payment card networks. Some issues are best approached 
through encouraging fairer and more adequate representation of all parties 
in interest in coordination among payment card networks. Other issues are 
best approached through encouraging more vigorous competition. We 
should not assume that the invisible hand will guide the payment card 
industry to the optimal outcome; but with limited regulatory corrections, 
payments card network liability rules can come closer to achieving a 
Coasean paradise, and making payments—the ultimate unavoidable 
transaction cost—more efficient, thereby reducing transaction costs 
throughout the rest of the economy. 
